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POST-AUTHORIZATION PROBLEMS IN THE
USE OF WIRETAPS: MINIMIZATION,
AMENDMENT, SEALING, AND INVENTORIES
One morrling in 1969, a New Jersey detective installed a tape
recorder and a set of earphones in a room overlooking a bar and
liquor store. Pursuant to a court order, he was using a wiretap to
overhear and record all the telephone calls made between the
hours of ten a.m. and three p.m. from and to a public pay
telephone in the store. The purpose of the wiretap was to catch a
man named Dye making telephone calls that would provide
evidence of violations of New .Jersey gambling laws. Because the
detective could not see the telephone from where he sat, he did not
know who was making the call, so he recorded every conversation
between ten and three and later rerecorded the incriminating
conversations onto a second tape. Out of a total of 105 hours of
recordings, two and one-half hours were incriminating and were
rerecorded; the rest of the recordings were apparently irrelevant,
most probably consisting of conversations of bar patrons. At Dye's
trial the prosecution introduced some of the incriminating
recordings in evidence, and the defense objected strenuously.'
The basis for the defense objection was the much-litigated and
little-analyzed constitutional and statutory requirement that the
agents manning a wiretap 2 must strive to minimize interception of
conversations that fall outside the scope of their wiretap order.
Because agents can never know exactly what they are about to
hear, even if they make conscientious efforts to edit out irrelevancies-unlike the New Jersey detective-they will always
intercept some conversations outside the strict scope of their order.
These interceptions have often provided ammunition for defense
efforts to procure suppression based on what has become known as
the minimization 3 ground-the first of four wiretap problems to be
analyzed in this Comment.
Since wiretapping constitutes a search and seizure, law
State v. Dye, 60 NJ. 518, 291 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972).
The material in this Comment applies equally to wiretapping-the interception of
wire communications using a listening device attached to the communication facility-and to
bugging-the interception of oral communications through the use of a microphone. The term
"wiretapping" will be used throughout, however, as a simple shorthand to refer to both types of
eavesdropping.
3 The term "minimization" refers to the process of limiting interception of
conversations to those described in the search warrant, or, as it is commonly called in the
wiretap context, the eavesdropping order. If the monitoring agent fails to minimize, he
produces "overage," which is the nonpertinent portion of the intercepted conversations.
2
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enforcement authorities must show probable cause and obtain the
equivalent of a search warrant, and the operation of the wiretap
itself is subject to the fourth amendment. 4 The duty of
minimization arises from the particularity and reasonableness
requirements of the fourth amendment, as well as from federal
and state statutes.
The defense in State v. Dye5 argued that the detective
monitoring the wiretap had failed to minimize interception of
conversations outside the scope of his warrant. 6 They claimed that
the detective's failure to turn off his tape recorder and remove his
earphones, even when he knew he was overhearing innocent
patrons of the bar, violated both the fourth amendment and the
New Jersey statute.7 The New Jersey Supreme Court did not agree,
and held that the policeman correctly listened to and recorded all
the calls so long as he made an effort to limit the hours of'the day
during which he operated the tap.
This decision is at odds with nearly all the federal cases and
illustrates the extent to which confusion and inconsistency beset the
minimization case law. Although the fourth amendment and the
federal wiretap authorization statutes-Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 8-establish the basic
minimization standards in all United States courts, 9 the resulting
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
5 60 N.J. 518, 291 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972). For a discussion of this
case, see notes 132-36 and accompanying text infra.
6 Id. at 534-42, 291 A.2d at 833-37.
7 Id. New Jersey's minimization statute is N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-12(f) (1971). For a
discussion of this statute and the recent amendments, see notes 131-32 infra. Under standard
constitutional law, Dye's request for suppression would be denied for lack of standing; the
rights in question belonged to the bar patrons, not to Dye. See, e.g., Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), where the Court stated: "The established principle is that
suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only
by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely
by the introduction of the damaging evidence." Id. at 171-72. Courts ruling on minimization
have generally ignored the standing problem, however, and have assumed that Title III
creates a suppression remedy that overcomes lack of standing. See note 184 infra.
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
9 Although 24 jurisdictions have statutes authorizing wiretapping, the federal statute is
binding on the states through the supremacy clause of the Constitution. The states have
generally ruled that their wiretapping laws are not completely preempted by the federal
statute, but rather that Title III, now codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970), sets
minimum standards for state wiretapping legislation, and that states may choose to be more
restrictive in authorizing wiretapping. See People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 271, 522 P.2d
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decisions of state and federal courts provide no cleat picture of
how to conduct a wiretap. A careful law-enforcement officer who
read all the cases could only conclude that sometimes the courts
have enforced the minimization requirement strictly and literally
and sometimes the courts have been flexible and permissive.
Minimization is not the only problem that law-enforcement
officers face in the use of wiretaps. This Comment treats the four
most significant legal problems encountered in the execution of a
court-authorized wiretap: minimization, amendment of the wiretap
order, sealing the tapes upon termination of surveillance, and
service of inventories on interested parties. As with the
minimization problem, the decisions in the other three areas fail to
provide a clear guide to proper wiretap procedure. This Comment
is an effort to derive from the cases standards by which to evaluate
police conduct in the use of wiretaps. Where the cases conflict or
seem wrongly decided, an effort is made to resolve the conflict, to
suggest different results, and to map for law enforcement officials
the contours of what the courts most probably will and will not permit.
I
MINIMIZATION

Conceptual Background
In 1928 the first Supreme Court opinion to consider the
wiretap problem declared that the fourth amendment did not
apply because a wiretap did not entail a physical trespass.' 0 The
Court's thinking has become far more sophisticated since then,
A.

1049, 1057, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241, 249, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1064 (1974); Commonwealth
v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833, 835 (Mass. 1975); State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86
(1972). The 24 jurisdictions and their respective statutes are: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970);
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1051 to -1061 (Supp. 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 16-15-101 to -104, 18-9-301 to -310 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-187 to -189,
54-41a to -41s (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1335-36 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-541 to -556 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01-.10 (Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 26-3001 to -3010 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to -2519 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE
C.J. §§ 10-401 to -408 (1974); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1974); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.01-.23 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 86-701 to -707 (1971); NEV.
REv. STAT. §§ 179.410-.515, 200.610-.690 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A:1 to -A:11
(1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 to -26 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-12-1.1 to -1.10
(Supp.1973); N.Y. CriM. PRO. LAw §§ 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1971), N.Y. PENAL LAw §§
250.00-.20 (McKinney 1967); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 141.720-.990 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§§12-5.1-1 to -16 (Supp. 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 23-13A-I to -11 (Supp. 1974);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.1-89.1 to -89.10 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.73.030-.100
(Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27-.33 (Supp. 1975).
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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however, and more recent opinions transcend the technical
definitions of "search" and "seizure" in order to apply the fourth
amendment's restraints to wiretap investigations. 1 '
The modern premise that a wiretap in some way constitutes a
search and seizure is now so well accepted that it is easy to forget
that the Court might not have applied the fourth amendment at
all. Wiretapping is more like an investigation than a search: it is a
police technique to explore conspiracies that are impervious to
normal methods of law enforcement. 1 2 Unlike a search and seizure
situation, the officer applying for an eavesdropping order often
has only a vague idea of the type of conversation he is seeking.
Whereas the search and seizure often ends an investigation by
providing the needed evidence, a wiretap is often used at the
beginning of an investigation to identify suspects and to explore
the extent of conspiracies. Moreover, the eavesdropping order
itself often specifies that its purpose is investigatory and that the
tap should not terminate when incriminating evidence is first
discovered. 13
"1 Id. (fourth amendment does not prohibit wiretapping unless there is a physical
trespass); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (fourth amendment not violated by
listening device placed against outside of a wall because there was no trespass); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (bug involving trespass violated fourth amendment, but
result held not to rest on technicalities of local trespass law); Wong Sun v. United States,
971 U.S. 471 (1963) (verbal evidence may be a "fruit" of official illegality and thus subject to
suppression); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (agent could record his own
conversation with suspect without violating the fourth amendment); Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323, 329-31 (1966) ("precise and discriminate" procedures limiting court-authorized
bug did not violate fourth amendment); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (New York
law authorizing Wiretapping struck down for failure to provide safeguards to keep wiretap
from becoming general search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (otherwise valid
bug invalidated by lack of prior judicial approval as required by fourth amendment warrant
clause). See generally Cranwell,JudicialFine-Tuningof Electronic Surveillance, 6 SETON HALL L.
REv. 225, 227-43 (1975).
12 See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, Approved Draft,

1971, 13-98 [hereinafter cited as A.B.A.

MINIMUM STANDARDS].

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice has said that "the American system was not designed with Cosa Nostra-type
criminal organizations in mind, and it has been notably unsuccessful to date in
preventing such organizations from preying on society." The commission
concluded, too, that only "in New York have law enforcement officials achieved
some level of continuous success in bringing prosecutions against organized
crime." The success was attributed "primarily to a combination of dedicated and
competent personnel and adequate legal tools." Electronic surveillance techniques
were termed "the tools."
Id. at 75-76 (emphasis in original).
11 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970) provides:
(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or oral
communication shall specify-
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Much of the conceptual difficulty surrounding wiretap law
stems from this basic source-the technique is by its very nature
investigatory and bears only a rough resemblance to a traditional
search for tangible evidence. Yet- the fourth amendment is held to
govern, and a modern method of electronic investigation must be
shoehorned into the centuries-old categories of search and
seizure. 14
The minimization problem arises from this initial tension.
Wiretapping is imprecise because in the normal case the
monitoring agent does not know exactly what he is going to hear
until he hears it.1 5 Thus most agents have been reluctant to unplug
their earphones for fear that they will miss an important
conversation.16 But the fourth amendment restricts the scope of
the search and commands that only those things described in the
warrant may be seized. 17 In a search for tangible evidence, an object
improperly seized is simply returned to its owner; but a
conversation, once intercepted, can never truly be returned.' 8 The
monitoring agent must therefore strive to intercept only those
conversations described in the order. Perfection in this regard is
unattainable because portions of irrelevant talk will always be heard
before an agent determines that a conversation is outside the scope
(e) .. . a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically
terminate when the described communication has been first obtained.
This section gives the authorizing judge the flexibility to make the tap self-terminating if
evidence against a group of individuals is all that is desired, or to permit the tap to continue
in an investigatory posture after enough evidence to secure convictions has been obtained.
14 Justice Black, dissenting in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) believed the
fourth amendment should not be stretched to cover wiretapping:
[T]he Amendment only bans searches and seizures of "persons, houses, papers and
effects." This literal language imports tangible things ....
It simply requires an
imaginative transformation of the English language to say that conversations can be
searched and words seized.
Id. at 78.
'" See, e.g., United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 541 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); United States v.
LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 196 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
'0 One court sharply criticized this tendency. "By justifying blanket surveillance on the
ground that something relevant might turn up at any moment, the requirement of
minimization would be rendered nugatory and the right of privacy nonexistent." United
States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 541 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
The Supreme Court stated in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927):
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be
seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of
one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is
left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
Id. at 196.
18 United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
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of his warrant and should not be monitored. 19 The fourth
amendment bars only unreasonable searches, and seizures, and it
seems reasonable to expect that some innocent conversations will
be picked up. 20 But since such conversations are outside the scope
of the warrant, the agent assumes a duty to make a reasonable effort
to minimize the number of innocent conversations he searches and
seizes. 21 An agent who makes no effort to do so would cause the
search to be unreasonable as a matter of constitutional law and the
evidence would be suppressed. 2
The Supreme Court's opinion in Berger v. New York 23 supports
the view that minimization is a constitutional requirement.2 4
In explaining its reasons for striking down a permissive New York
wiretap authorization law, the court stated:
[T]he statute's failure to describe with particularity the
conversations sought gives the officer a roving commission to
"seize" any and all conversations. It is true that the statute
19 United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Bynum,

360 F. Supp. 400, 409 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other

grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
20 United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2' [The Statute] . . . requires the intercept procedure to be conducted so as to

reduce to the smallest possible number the interception of "innocent" calls. In this
context the word "possible" means "feasible" or "practicable" while still allowing the
legitimate law enforcement aims of the statute to be accomplished. This is but
another way of saying that the methods and efforts utilized in minimization must be
reasonable, the traditional and acceptable standard of measuring the validity of a
search under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md. 1972).
22 In Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957), F.B.I. agents arrested petitioners at
a secluded cabin and proceeded to conduct a search incident to the arrest. The search was
exhaustive, and the agents literally seized and removed the entire contents of the cabin. The
Court stated: "The seizure of the entire contents of the house and its removal some two
hundred miles away to the F. B. I. offices for the purpose of examination are beyond the
sanction of any of our cases." Id. at 347. Although the Court approved seizure of items from
the persons of the defendants, the scope of seizure was otherwise so broad that the entire
search and seizure was vitiated and the items seized should not have been received in
evidence.
The clear implication of this case is that if a monitoring agent makes no effort to limit
seizures to the conversations described in the warrant, the search and seizure will be entirely
void, and the evidence so obtained will be unusable in a prosecution of any of the defendants
whose rights have been violated.
A recent case from the District of Columbia Circuit suggests, however, that a search and
seizure may be reasonable even when the agent makes no effort to minimize. In United
States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court declined to suppress the wiretap
evidence even though the government admittedly had intercepted all calls and had made no
effort to minimize. The court found that interception of all calls would have been reasonable
in the circumstances of the case, and that the agents' subjective intent was of no importance.
See note 110 infra.
23 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
24 But see Note, Minimization: In Search of Standards, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 60, 63 (1973).
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requires the naming of "the person or persons whose
communications, conversations or discussions are to be
overheard or recorded. . ." But this does no more than identify
the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded
rather than "particularly describing" the communications,
conversations, or discussions to be seized. As with general
warrants this leaves 2too
much to the discretion of the officer
5
executing the order.
.

The monitoring officer, apparently, may not be given a "roving
commission" to seize what he desires. The warrant must limit him
to particular conversations, and he must limit himself to seizing
what is described or the warrant would be meaningless.
In striking down the New York statute, Berger also laid out a
blueprint for a constitutional wiretapping statute.2 6 The Supreme
27
Court clarified its views the folloVing year in Katz v. United States,
and Congress responded with Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.28 Title III outlaws private
wiretapping 29 and establishes rigorous standards governing
applications for a wiretap. The application is required to
demonstrate that probable cause exists to believe that (1) one of an
enumerated list of crimes has been, is being, or will be committed;
(2) particular communications concerning that crime will be
obtained; and (3) the facilities to be tapped are being used in
connection with commission of the crime. 30 The order, or warrant,
25

388 U.S. at 59.

26 The statute was struck down because it did not clearly require a showing of probable

cause that evidence of a crime would be obtained, the eavesdropping order was not required
to describe with particularity the place to be searched or the persons or things to be seized,
the time limits on the wiretap were vague and excessively long, and the statute did not
require notice to persons whose conversations had been seized. At the same time, the Court
very plainly implied that if the defects in the New York statute were corrected, the resulting
statute would pass constitutional muster.
27 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
28 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). The legislative history of Title III, contained in the
senate report, states forthrightly that the statute was drafted specifically in response to Berger
and Katz. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted, U.S.C.C. & A.N. 2112,
2153 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY]. Although the Supreme Court has
not yet passed on the question, the courts that have considered Title III have
overwhelmingly declared it constitutional. Accord, United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1975); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir.
1973); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973);
United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972). Contra, United
States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
29 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970).
30 Id. § 2518(3).
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issued when the application is approved must specify the identity
of the person, if known, whose communications are to be
intercepted; the nature and location of the facilities to be tapped;
the type of communication sought and the crime to which it
relates; the period of time for which the tap is authorized; and
whether or not the tap is to terminate automatically when the type
31
of communication sought is first intercepted.
Title III also provides standards for the conduct of wiretaps,
and includes an explicit minimization rule:
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that
the authorization to intercept shall be ... conducted in such a

way as to minimize the interception of communications
not
32
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter.
This section expressly commands the monitoring officer to
minimize interceptions of "innocent 33 conversations and gives the
minimization rule statutory, as well as constitutional, dimension. A
critical threshold question immediately arises, however. Although
the constitutional analysis showed that the thing to be minimized is
the search and seizure of innocent conversations,3 4 the statute
uses the word interception throughout. What, then, is an
interception?
Although the statute itself defines interception as "aural
acquisition" 35 -literally, to come into possession through the sense
of hearing-this definition offers little guidance. The agent on the
spot must know whether he is required to minimize the number of
innocent conversations overheard, recorded, transcribed, or
disclosed, and it is not obvious which of these constitute an aural
31 Id. § 2518(4).
32 Id. § 2518(5). The statute further provides:
The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by any means
authorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other
comparable device. The recording of the contents of any ... communication ...
shall be done in such way as will protect the recording from editing or other
alterations.
Id. § 2518(8)(a).
33 An innocent conversation is one which should not be intercepted because it is outside
the scope of the warrant. For a discussion of what conversations may be properly
intercepted, see notes 70-82 and accompanying text infra.
14 See notes 17-26 and accompanying text supra.
35 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970). The aural acquisition must also be through the use of
some electronic, mechanical, or other device, so that simple overhearing of a conversation
via the naked ear is not an interception. This provision flows from the constitutional premise
that the use of searchlights or fieldglasses to observe activity that is out in the open does not
constitute a search under the fourth amendment. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563
(1927); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432, 433 (10th Cir. 1968).
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acquisition. 6 Since an agent cannot properly comply with the
statute unless he knows what to minimize, it is surprising to note
that there has been little judicial effort to define the term
"interception"; in fact, most courts seem to have been unaware that
a question exists. As a result, the courts have used the term to mean
different things, and there is little uniformity even among the
federal decisions. One New York court apparently held that
recording alone constitutes an interception; 37 a federal district
court adopted an "overhearing" definition;3 8 and a federal court of
appeals indicated that the interception takes place when the tapes
39
are transcribed or disclosed.
The disagreement among the courts is not surprising, for the
statute is ambiguous. Some writers point to the section of Title III
that directs that all interceptions should also be recorded and infer
from this language that "interception" cannot be synonymous with
"recording. '40 It seems likely, however, that the purpose of this
section was to avoid the situation in which a monitor overhears
incriminating evidence but fails to record it, leaving the defendant
36 In instructing its own attorneys in how to run a wiretap, the Department of Justice
has stated candidly that it does not really know what "aural acquisition" means. The
Department's wiretap instruction manual, the contents of which were kept secret for several
years, states: "[I]t
is not . . . clear what is intended to be included in the terms 'aural
acquisition' . . . . U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR CONDUCT OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE DEPT. MANUAL].

"Aural acquisition" alone might indicate that interception is overhearing since the
human faculty of hearing is not exercised when a tape recorder stores a conversation. But in
a broader sense, the machine is hearing the conversation and making a permanent record for
others to hear; the machine has "acquired" the conversation through an "aural" mechanism.
"Acquisition" can be construed in an even broader sense to mean use of, or exercise of
dominion over. In that case, interception might not occur until the tape had been
transcribed, i.e., transformed into readily usable form, or even offered in evidence.
37 People v. Castania, 73 Misc. 2d 166, 172, 340 N.Y.S.2d 829, 835 (County Ct. 1973).
31 United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 409 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d
Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
39 In United States v. Bynum, 475 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit noted:
"The mischief lies in the interception obviously and what was not transcribed remains
unknown." Id. at 837. The implication seems to be that if it was not transcribed, it was not
intercepted.
On remand the district court adopted the "overhear" definition. 360 F. Supp. at 409. In
the court of appeals for the second time, the court recognized the definitional problem and
ducked it: "We need not determine, however, whether the interception prohibited by the
statute is aural intrusion or mechanical recordation." 485 F.2d 490, 502 (2d Cir. 1973).
40 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1970). See note 32 and accompanying text supra for text of
the statute. See also United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 408-09 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485
F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); Note, Minimization:In
Search of Standards, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 60, 70 (1973). At best, this analysis shows that
"interception" is not the same as "recording," but it cannot identify the "true" definition of
interception. At worst, this analysis misconstrues the intent of Congress. See note 41 and
accompanying text infra.
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no way to attack the agent's recollection at trial. 41 The statute does
not provide for the reverse situation in which the agent records a
conversation but does not overhear it at the time. In fact, the
statute shows no awareness at all of the problem which is created by
the use of the word "interception."
If the draftsmen had considered which part of the wiretapping
process was to constitute an interception, they certainly would have
specified their intent in the statute. 42 The rest of the statute is
painstakingly written, and the only conclusion that may be drawn
from the omission is that Congress did not consider the question at
all.
Although the statute provides no guidance as to the proper
meaning of "interception,"- minimization is a constitutional
requirement and the fourth amendment should therefore yield a
working definition. A careful application of traditional search and
seizure law, however, results in no better than shaky conclusions.
According to pre-Title III doctrine, a search is said to differ
from a seizure in that a search is defined as a perception of a
quantity of things, among which are the items to be seized, 43 while
a seizure is an exercise of dominion over the items that have been
located in the search. 44 Both search and seizure must be
reasonable. 4 5 The scope of the search is reasonable if it goes no
further than is necessary to find the items specified in the
warrant. 4 6 For example, an officer searching for a car may do no
more than glance into areas that could hide a car; he may not look
in drawers or closets. Similarly, an officer searching for a revolver
may search all places that could hide a revoNer; he may search in
drawers and closets, but he may not poke pins in tubes of
toothpaste or open envelopes to read*the contents. The scope of a
seizure is reasonable if it does not exceed the items described in the
warrant plus other evidence that is in plain view during the
47
search.
41 The legislative history to § 2518(8)(a) merely paraphrases the statute and gives no
clue to the draftsmen's intent. The same is true of the minimization section, § 2518(5).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2192-93.

42 The Supreme Court used this same method of statutory analysis in interpreting a
different section of Title III in United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 152-53 (1974).
43 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 97-100 (1967) (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.).
44 Id.
5 See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,356-57 (1931); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (concurring opinion, Miller, J.); Note, Minimization and the
Fourth Amendment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 861, 868-74 (1974).
41 Cf Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
47 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-68 (1971).
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Thus both search and seizure must be minimized-search,
because it must be limited to a search for seizable items, and
seizure, because it must be limited to the items in the warrant. This
result is not easily transferred to the wiretap context; for it is surely
not obvious which parts of the surveillance process correspond to a
search and which parts to a seizure. Two dissenting opinions in
Berger address this problem. Justice White reasoned that a
monitoring agent is only searching when he overhears or records
conversations:
Petitioner suggests that the search is inherently overbroad
because the eavesdropper will overhear conversations which do
not relate to criminal activity. But the same is true of almost all
searches of private property which the Fourth Amendment
permits. In searching for seizable matters, the police must
necessarily see or hear, and comprehend, items which do not
relate to the purpose of the search. That this occurs, however,
does not render the search invalid .

.

. so long as the police, in

executing that warrant, limit themselves
to searching for items
which may constitutionally be seized. 48
He added in a footnote that "[r]ecording an innocent conversation is
no more a 'seizure' than occurs when the policeman personally
overhears conversation while conducting a search with a
warrant."4 9 Justice Harlan agreed and concluded that seizure of a
conversation must be something beyond overhearing or recording:
[I]n my view, conversations are not "seized" either by
eavesdropping alone, or by their recording so that they may later
be heard at the eavesdropper's convenience. Ju'st as some
exercise of dominion, beyond mere perception, is necessary for
the seizure of tangibles, so some use of the conversation beyond
the initial listening
process is required for the seizure of the
50
spoken word.

Justice White would equate overhearing with a search. Since a
search must be minimized, overhearing must also be minimized.
Justice Harlan would equate a seizure with "some use of the
conversation."' 5 1 Since seizure must be minimized, uses such as

transcription of the tapes or disclosure of their contents
presumably must also be minimized. According to both Justices,
recording alone is not a seizure. But neither Justice explains what
48 388 U.S. at 108 (dissenting opinion, White, J.).
49

Id.

50 Id. at 98 (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.). Harlan's and White's reasoning was
followed in United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 408-09 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
51 388 U.S. at 98.
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recording alone is. It is not necessarily a search, for the tape may
never be played back and no human ear will ever hear the
conversation. 52 But if recording is also not a seizure, then what is
it?
The analogy between wiretapping and search and seizure thus
breaks down in its details, and any effort to make the comparison
results in"anomalies that belie the technique. Moreover, the
majority opinions of the Supreme Court in the wiretap cases have
made no effort to make the specific analogy and have used the
fourth amendment only in a vague, conclusory fashion. 53
A wiretap simply does not fit into the ancient conceptual
categories. It is not a two-step process of perception and acquisition
as is a search for tangible items. Wiretapping more accurately takes
place all at once; the words are heard and recorded and the
process is complete. Preparing the tapes for use by transcribing
them is not logically necessary and is really an additional and
separate act. "Search" and "seizure" are inadequate terms to
describe the process of wiretapping. The definition of interception,
therefore, will be found neither by analyzing the Supreme Court's
54
interpretations of search and seizure nor by analyzing the statute.
The Supreme Court has decided that the fourth amendment
governs and the best way to define interception is to take the broad
perspective and ask what definition will, as a matter of policy and
practicality, best effect the purpose of Title III and the fourth
amendment. 55 The Court in Katz rephrased the fourth amendment
52 Cf.State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 528-37, 291 A.2d 825, 830-34, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090

(1972) (continuous recording violates neither the statute nor the Constitution; implies
strongly that seizure occurred when the guilty conversations were picked out of the
continuous tape and transcribed onto a "work copy"). For a discussion of this case, see notes
132-36 and accompanying text infra.
53 In Berger, the Court avoided defining search or seizure in the wiretapping context:
"[O]ur subsequent cases . . . found 'conversation' was within the Fourth Amendment's
protections, and that the use of electronic devices to capture it was a 'search' within the
meaning of the Amendment. .. ." 388 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added). "Likewise the statute's
failure to describe with particularity the conversations sought gives the officer a roving
commission to 'seize' any and all conversations." Id. at 59 (emphasis added). The Court's
opinion in Katz was equally imprecise: "The Government's activities in electronically listening
to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
• . . and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 389 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added). The Court's opinions thus offer little assistance in an
analysis of wiretapping in search and seizure terms.
54 See notes 35-42 and accompanying text supra.
" The legislative history shows that Congress intended the ultimate aim of Title III to
be the preservation of privacy consistent with effective law enforcement. The legislative
history states in the introduction:
Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral
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to protect an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against
unreasonable intrusion, 5 6 and thus the proper definition of
"interception" is the one that will best protect that expectation.
Overhearing is the very heart-of invasion of privacy; unknown
to the parties conversing, a silent third party is listening to what is
thought to be private. "Interception" at a minimum must cover
overhearing. 57 A conversation that is both overheard and recorded
is therefore also intercepted. The problem case is the conversation
that is recorded but not simultaneously overheard, for as long as
the tape is not played back, the contents of the conversation remain
known only to the original participants.
As a matter of policy, however, mere recording should also be
held to constitute interception.5" A conversation, once recorded,
may be replayed at will. A monitoring agent has little incentive to
be selective when he listens to a tape, and particularly if he can
locate a private place to play it back, he will always be tempted to
listen to everything to ensure that no incriminating conversations
were missed. 59 No one can tell exactly which parts of a recorded
tape have been played back and which parts remain secret, and if
the replaying was done privately, a court must rely on the agent's
unsupported word as to which parts he replayed. The person
transcribing the tape will inevitably listen to parts that are
communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and
conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be
authorized.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2135. See also United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
56 389 U.S. at 350-53.
'7 The Department of Justice believes that overhearing constitutes an interception. The
wiretap instruction manual which the department distributes to attorneys who supervise
wiretaps states:
[T]he desirability of recording the intercepted communication is obvious. Since
evidence of the intercepted conversation would be admissible in future trials it is
preferable to produce the verbatim recording rather than relying solely on the
memory of the agent who overheard the conversation.
JUSTicE DEPT. MANUAL 28 (emphasis added).
58 See the persuasive discussion in Note, Minimization of Wire Interception: Presearch

Guidelines and Postsearch Remedies, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1415-17 (1974).
'9 In United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417
U.S. 903 (1974), the court noted the appellant's argument that recording should constitute
an interception:
Appellants respond that the statute was never intended to permit recordation
of all conversations. Such a construction would, in their view, allow the Government
or anyone else to legally create a tape library of the conversations of any citizen. If
such reasoning were applied to the situation of a warrant covering tangible items,
seizure of the contents of a whole house would be permissible, in their view, on the
ground that to do so would prevent any destruction or disappearance of
exculpatory evidence.
Id. at 502 n.6. The court did not decide the point, however. See note 39 supra.
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irrelevant to the investigation, and others may hear the entire tape
for any of several reasons. 60 Furthermore, if all conversations are
recorded, but only some are overheard, the defendant has no
means of challenging the agent's testimony that certain conversations
were not overheard, aside from the agent's own logs. 61 If only those
conversations which are overheard are recorded, however, the
defendant has a taped record showing exactly which conversations
were, in fact, intercepted.
Three years after the passage of Title III, the New York
legislature amended its wiretap authorization law to conform to the
federal statute. Presented with a chance to resolve the ambiguous
Title III definition of interception, the legislature stated
forthrightly, "'Intercepted communication' means (a) a telephonic
or telegraphic communication which was intentionally overheard
or recorded .... 62 This redefinition by a prestigious state legislature is a substantial factor militating in favor of a recordor-overhear interpretation.
The major problem with a rule making a recording constitute
an interception is that the tapes resulting from the agents'
switching the recorder off each time they stop listening are a
fragmentary and incomplete record of the suspects' pattern of
communications. The defendants may always charge that the
wiretap was edited or that statements were taken out of context,
and the government would have difficulty refuting the charge
without a complete taped record. 63 Moreover, persons trying to
pursue a civil remedy under section 2520 for illegal interception of
their communications may need a complete, taped record as
64
evidence in the suit.
0 Thejudge may listen to the tape, for instance, to get some idea of how it sounded when
the agents first heard it, or to determine whether a claim that portions were difficult to
understand is valid. The judge may use a representative to analyze the tapes for him, as in
United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), and both the defense and
prosecution regularly prepare statistical analyses of the tapes after listening to every word of
every tape. See, e.g., United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523,542 (S.D. Cal. 1971); United States
v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1049 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929,
932 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
61 It has been federal practice for agents to keep logs of time, duration, and
approximate content of each conversation intercepted. The procedure used in one
investigation is described in detail in United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 880 (D.N.J.
1973).
62 N.Y. CPIM. PRO. LAW § 700.05(3) (McKinney 1971).
63 United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357,1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971); State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518,
53940, 291 A.2d 825, 836, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972).
64 For a discussion of the 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970) civil remedy, see notes 164-66 and
accompanying text infra. Generally, § 2520 creates a cause of action accruing to a person
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This difficulty could be overcome through the use of
court-appointed representatives or a sealed, voice-actuated
recorder to produce a complete taped record which was not at any
time available to the monitoring agents or to the prosecution, and
which would be sealed and never opened unless the defendants so
moved.6 5 Since this definition- of interception is policy-based, it
would not be troublesome to hold that the monitors' work-tapes
constitute interceptions, but that a sealed complete set of tapes
produced solely for the benefit of the defendants is not prohibited.
B.

The Scope of Interception

Once the monitoring agent knows that a conversation is
intercepted when it is overheard or recorded, he is ready to put the
minimization principle into practice. Before he can properly do so,
however, he must know what kinds of conversations he is not
permitted to intercept.
The case law on this subject is comprehensive but inconsistent.
It covers seven years of wiretapping practice under Title III, and
as the minimization issue has been repeatedly litigated, the
decisions have generally become increasingly sophisticated.
Minimization practices have sharply improved, 66 and many
whose communications are illegally intercepted, used, or disclosed, against the person
committing the violation.
61 See notes 141-44 and accompanying text infra.
66 In the first year of wiretapping under Title III little effort was made anywhere to
comply with the minimization section. But when the federal courts began to suppress
evidence as a result of the government's failure to minimize, the Department of Justice and
its investigating attorneys rapidly became aware of the minimization problem and began to
develop techniques to deal with it. Cf JUSTICE DEPT. MANUAL 35-40 (little sensitivity to
minimization as of 1970). Similar problems plagued state district attorneys. In an evaluation
of the wiretap practices of the Kings County, New York, District Attorney, a report prepared
by the National Wiretap Commission stated:
[D]uring the period immediately following the enactment of the New York
equivalent of Title III, the Kings County D.A. took few if any steps to insure [sic]
that the non-consensual electronic surveillance utilized by his office were carried out
in accordance with the demanding standards embodied in that legislation. By and
large, the early taps which the [National Wiretap] Commission staff had the
opportunity to review were marked by the kinds of sloppy practices with which the
decisions in Berger & Katz were concerned and which the draftsman of Title III
sought to prevent.
ith the passage of time, however, the office apparently became more
familiar with the requirements of the new statute and more professional in its
utilization of the tool of electronic surveillance.
HEARINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAws

Staff Report on Kings County, Tab
C, at 5 (March 18-20, 1975). Compare United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971),
vacated, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd after remand, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (no
effort at minimization), with United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd,
RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE,
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inconsistencies in the decisions reflect the rapid developments in
practice.
Early cases simply. marshalled the facts of the particular
wiretap and then stated in conclusory fashion whether or not the
government had properly minimized. 67 Unfortunately, none
established comprehensive criteria for future cases. Later decisions
recognized that no fixed rules could adequately deal with the vast
array of different fact situations and that minimization would have
to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 68 The latest and most
sophisticated decisions identify the variables that determine in each
69
case whether the government has properly minimized.
On the most general level, an eavesdropping order allows
interception of conversations that provide "evidence of" certain
offenses.70 The evidence may be such as would incriminate a
specific individual,7 ' or of a kind that would aid the investigators in
perceiving the size, nature, identity and mode of operation of the
criminal enterprise. 72 Conversations that are irrelevant to the
investigation generally are not to be intercepted.7 3 These would
include innocent conversations between known suspects, 7

4

most

505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975) (comprehensive minimization
plan developed).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
6' See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019-21
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1975).
70 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F.
Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975) (wiretaps used to develop
evidence on known suspects operating single bookmaking operations).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (far-flung
narcotics conspiracy).
73 A clearly irrelevant conversation cannot provide "evidence of" a crime and is
therefore outside the scope of lawful interception under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970).
" But see United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. King,
335 F. Supp. 523, 542 (S.D. Cal. 1971). The Bynum court stated: "[Clalls between known
co-conspirators should be monitored, for relevant information may emerge at any point in a
call." 360 F. Supp. at 416.
This may be true where the co-conspirators are engaged in criminal enterprise on a
full-time basis, and the agent may reasonably expect that any call between conspirators will
be in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. But if the conspirators are only fringe
members of the criminal enterprise and they are also social acquaintances, their calls to each
other may only infrequently touch on criminal matters, and the agents would definitely not
be justified in intercepting all interconspirator conversations.
As in Bynum, the courts have tended to state dogmatically that all calls between,
conspirators may be intercepted, but like other minimization rules, this one really should
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. See notes 83-110 and accompanying text
infra.
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conversations involving a third party known not to be involved in
the criminal enterprise,7 5 nearly all conversations involving two
people known not to be involved, 76 and all privileged
conversations. 77 By specific statutory provision, conversations
producing evidence of offenses other than those specified in the
warrant may be intercepted, provided that the monitoring agents
apply for an amendment to the original warrant as soon as
78

possible.

Beyond these initial generalities, few ironclad rules exist.
When the suspects were aware that their phones were tapped, and
so spoke in a difficult code, the agents were held to be justified in
intercepting nearly every conversation.7

9

But when the monitoring

agents intercepted the suspect's wife speaking to local merchants,
and his family speaking to their friends, the court held that the
80
agents did not have the right to intercept all conversations.
Defining the scope of permissible interception really entails a
two-step process of analysis. The first is determining which
conversations are proper subjects for interception, and the second
is determining how much leeway to allow agents who intercept
more than is strictly proper before decreeing a failure to minimize.
1. Interception of Nonpertinent Conversations
Partly because in retrospect it is often easy to separate
pertinent conversations from nonpertinent ones, 8 the courts have
made almost no effort to arrive at a working definition of what
constitutes a pertinent conversation. Nevertheless, the cases show a
strong inclination to find pertinent any conversation that has any
75 Where the conversation with the uninvolved third party has provided pertinent
information, however, the courts have tended to allow interception. See, e.g., United States v.
Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 882-83 (D.N.J. 1973). See note 82 infra.
7 United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Sisca, 361
F. Supp. 735, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008
(1974).
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1970) (privileged communications do not lose their
privileged character when they are intercepted); United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191 (7th
Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974) (certain husband-wife conversations are
not privileged and are therefore subject to interception); JUSTIcE DEPT. MANUAL 35-38. See
notes 111-21 and accompanying text infra.
78 18 U.S:C. § 2517(5) (1970). See notes 167-221 and accompanying text infra.
79 United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
80 United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
81 At the time of interception, however, it can be very difficult indeed to discriminate
between pertinent and nonpertinent conversations. See, e.g., United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d
267, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975). See note 99 infra.
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conceivable connection to the investigation, no matter how
remote.8 2
The issue in the minimization cases, however, is usually not
which conversations were pertinent. The dispute more often
centers on whether the agents have intercepted too many
nonpertinent conversations. More accurately stated, the question
has two prongs. First, how freely may agents intercept
conversations that very clearly were not going to provide
evidence-obviously innocent calls. Second, how freely may agents
intercept conversations that appear at the time to be in the gray
area between clearly relevant and clearly irrelevant in the hope that
the conversation will take a pertinent turn or will later seem
pertinent in the light of new information.
Although the question should be split into these two
82

In United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 478

(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975), for instance, the court held that interception
of many debatably pertinent calls was proper. The court allowed interception of calls to the
telephone company (to find out whether telephone service was about to be discontinued),
calls to travel agencies and airlines (to keep track of the movements of what was described as an
international heroin ring), calls to a bank to procure money (because the money was needed to
buy narcotics), and calls to persons who were not identified (since one purpose of the tap was to
develop the extent and identity of the conspiracy).Id. at 882. A number of courts have stated in
dicta that, because of the high probability that pertinent material will turn up, any conversation
between known conspirators is automatically subject to interception, even if the talk appears to
be confined to gossip. See note 74 supra. The court in Fakone went even further:
It is appropriate to note at this juncture that [the special agent in
charge] believed that a call between a conspirator and a clearly established
non-conspirator was not as a rule to be recorded. I do not regard minimization
under the statute or my Order as requiring this limited view. Conversations of this
nature may often be highly significant to an investigation of a far flung and
sophisticated conspiracy such as this is alleged to be. The non-conspirator may, in
fact, become a conspirator in the near future or even during the very call being
monitored. The non-conspirator may, however innocently, aid the other party in
furtherance of an illegal objective by, for example, making travel arrangements, or
arranging financial assistance for the illegal enterprise. Also... the conspirator may
either volunteer information or respond to innocent questions with highly incriminating answers.
Id. at 883. This view seems excessively permissive. Protection of privacy is ignored and the
law enforcement aspect dominates. Because of the remote possibility that the conspirator will
volunteer incriminating information or that he will try to recruit the innocent party, the
privacy of innocent citizens may be invaded under this view any time they receive a call from
a conspirator. The legislative history of Title III shows that one of the primary purposes of
the statute was to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications. See note 55 supra.
The right to privacy clearly is not to be ignored every time there is an opportunity, no
matter how remote, to obtain evidence. Title III does not guarantee that law enforcement
officers will hear every pertinent word, regardless of how many innocent conversations are
intercepted; indeed, that is the whole purpose of the minimization section. See United States
v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 541 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974). The court in Falcone has surely struck the balance
between privacy and law enforcement in a manner inconsistent with the spirit of Title III.
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components-interception of possibly pertinent and obviously
nonpertinent calls-the courts have not done so explicitly, and the
clarity of the case law has suffered for it. Different methods of
evaluation should apply on the one hand to interception of possibly
pertinent conversations which later turn out to be nonpertinent,
and on the other hand to interception of conversations which were
patently, innocent from the beginning, such as a conversation
involving nonconspirators using a pay telephone. The courts
should generally be flexible and tolerant when dealing with the first
kind of overage, and rigid and unbending when dealing with the
second-the first kind of overage can be defended as a reasonable
search for a seizable conversation, but the second cannot be so
defended.
The courts have not drawn this distinction, however, and the
cases can more practically be explained in a different way. There
appear to be six variables which, when evaluated in the context of
each case, account for most of the minimization decisions. Which
variables apply will vary from case to case, and in some cases a
single variable will be determinative.
(1) Objective of the wiretap. The objective of a wiretap may
range from simple conviction of a known individual 8 3 to
exploration of an unknown, far-flung conspiracy. 84 The courts
have generally allowed a greater margin of error to agents
conducting a more ambitious investigation and have found a wider
range of calls to be pertinent.8 5 In one complex investigation of a
multi-state narcotics conspiracy, a federal district court held that
monitoring agents were justified in intercepting 100 percent of the
calls. 8 6 In a far more simple investigation, involving only a few
suspects and a pay telephone, the court held agents to strict
87
compliance with its minimization directive.
(2) Location and use of the telephone. Sometimes a
telephone is located in a headquarters used exclusively to direct
83 See, e.g., United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1972). See also cases cited
in note 71 supra.

84 See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
85
,See note 82 supra.
86 United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The conspiracy was also
allegedly responsible for "murders, robberies, ('take-offs' of other drug dealers), thefts,
possession of stolen property, the use of lethal weapons, bribery and the obstruction of
justice." Id. at 404. The suspects had so thoroughly corrupted local law enforcement officials
that outside agents had to be brought in to man the wiretap. Id. at 411. Moreover, the
application for the warrant showed that a number of attorneys were deeply involved with the
conspiracy. Id. at 404.
87 United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1972).
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criminal activities. Agents monitoring conversations over such a
telephone may reasonably expect that virtually all conversations
will be relevant and evidentiary. 8 8 In such cases the courts have
allowed interception of almost any kind of conversation on the
theory that any given conversation has a very high probability of
being relevant, and any irrelevant calls are discouraged in order to
keep the line available for business. 8 9 One district court even
allowed interception of many conversations involving a babysitter
at the headquarters who occasionally relayed messages from one
conspirator to another. 90
Other telephones may be located in family residences or in
public places, such as bars or street corners, where agents must
expect that evidentiary conversations will be overheard only when
the suspect is using the telephone. 9 1 In these cases, a very high
percentage of the calls is likely to be irrelevant, and the courts
have liberally found failures to minimize unless the agents have
made serious and conscientious efforts to screen out innocent
conversations. The theory here has been that users of family or
public telephones have a high expectation of privacy, and that
monitoring agents must be correspondingly vigilant.9 2 Interception
of only a handful of private calls out of thousands of criminal ones
emanating from a criminal headquarters is a de minimis problem,
and users of such a telephone have little socially recognized
expectation of privacy. Interception of a great many innocent calls
involving people who have a high expectation of privacy in their
homes or in phone booths, however, is a serious failure of
minimization.
(3) Nature of the criminal enterprise. Where the subject
matter of the conversations is inherently difficult to follow, as in
many narcotics conspiracies, the courts have allowed agents
88 United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1021-23 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1020 (1975); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 501 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
89 In one such case the court concluded:
The telephones in this case were used almost exclusively to conduct illegal
transactions; any personal conversations were mere specks in the torrent of
conspiratorial communications. The appellants were not in a position to insist that
their few legitimate personal remarks must be sieved out from the great volume of

their unlawful conversations.
United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
90 United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"' See, e.g., United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1972).
92 United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sisca, 361 F.
Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974);
United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
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considerable leeway in what they intercept. Most courts note that
the agents' efforts at minimization must be evaluated by using the
agents' own perspective; it is meaningless to argue after the fact
that a large percentage of the intercepted conversations were
innocent if the agents could not reasonably differentiate between
innocent and guilty conversations at the time of interception.9 3 The
courts have emphasized that a search need only be reasonable and
that this implies a reasonable effort to minimize. 94 The mere fact
that many innocent conversations were intercepted does not ipso
95
facto vitiate a wiretap.
9' See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
" 360 F. Supp. at 409-10; United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 42-43 (3d Cir.
1975).
95 Id. In United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
936 (1974), the court stated:
[Hiere as in Bynum, the conspiracy unveiled was a huge business involving millions
of dollars' worth of narcotics, numerous distributors and highly complex,
surreptitious telephone calls. . . . We too fail to see how any detailed screening
instructions... could be devised under these circumstances. Here no claim is made
that the Government could have formulated a pattern of innocent calls by which it
could have avoided intercepting those.
Id. at 600.
Although it is a good principle that monitoring agents should be given considerable
leeway in what they intercept when the subject matter is complex, the Second Circuit went
overboard in this case and permitted a classic failure to minimize. Claiming they could not
screen out innocent calls, agents intercepted every single conversation in its entirety-they
failed to minimize out even one of 1,595 calls. Id. at 599. The court concedes that not
even the monitoring agents at the time of interception thought that all the conversations
were pertinent, and then admits that the court's own analysis of the transcripts shows that
even fewer conversations were relevant. Id. at 599-600. Nevertheless, the court concluded:
"[W]e believe that the Government made a prima facie showing of compliance with the
minimization provision.
... Id. at 600.
The assertion that the agents were unable to screen out a single conversation despite a
good faith minimization effort strains credulity. Only two months after Manfredi, in an
extremely similar fact situation, the Second Circuit faced a case in which the agents were able
to minimize out a meaningful number of privileged and nonpertinent calls. United States v.
Rizzo, 491 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974). The Rizzo court, which
included two of the same judges that decided Manfredi, approved the successful
minimization effort with no reference to their permissive opinion in Manfredi. Furthermore,
in Bynum, upon which the court in Manfredi relied, agents managed to screen out ten percent
of the calls, whereas the Manfredi agents failed completely. The only explanation for the
puzzling result in Manfredi is that the Second Circuit was simply unwilling to suppress
evidence and risk letting obviously guilty defendants go free, particularly when they had
been in the destructive business of selling millions of dollars' worth of narcotics.
A wrongly-decided opinion like Manfredi can have far-reaching and damaging results.
Citing the Second Circuit's Manfredi opinion, the Seventh Circuit recently permitted agents
in one case to intercept every conversation, even though only 153 out of more than 2,000
calls were pertinent. United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 1975). Although
the suspects occasionally spoke in colloquial Spanish and used code to confuse the monitors,
it is nevertheless hard to believe that the agents were unable to identify a single conversation
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Where conversations involving the subject matter under
investigation are easily distinguishable from other calls, as in
gambling investigations, the courts have allowed fewer
interceptions of innocent calls. Gambling is easy to recognize
because callers placing bets must specify an event, their choice, and
the amount, and this type of conversation cannot be veiled in
ambiguous references or code words. 6 Since it is difficult to
defend a failure to distinguish between a betting conversation and
all others, the courts have allowed fewer interceptions of innocent
conversations in gambling investigations than in narcotics
investigations.9 7
(4) Use of code. Closely related to the last variable, the use of
code or guarded language usually affects a court's willingness to
permit interception of innocent conversations.9 8 The monitoring
agent, making a reasonable effort to distinguish between innocent
and evidentiary conversations, may nevertheless be unable to tell
the difference and consequently may be forced to intercept nearly
all conversations until the code is broken or the agent begins to
understand ambiguous guarded language.9 9 If the judge is
convinced that the agents have made a reasonable effort to make
as nonpertinent. See also United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 753-54, 757 n.13 (D.C. Cir.
1975). The Quintana-Manfredi interpretations of minimization could, if not limited or
overruled, effectively nullify the statute and raise serious doubts about the viability of
minimization.
96 See, e.g., United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 317 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 506
F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally A.B.A. MINIMUM STANDARDS 31-33.
97 Cf. United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1972) (failure to minimize in
a gambling investigation when suspect was using a public telephone).
" See United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 593-94, 597 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
99 It is difficult to believe how ambiguous and vague conversations can be until one

reads transcripts of actual wiretaps. A good example of the use of code and guarded language is cited in a footnote to United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 412 n.10 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). The court explained that seemingly innocent conversations were actually codes relating
to Bynum's narcotics trade:
IT]he inspectors detected that word codes and guarded language were employed by
the speakers to hide the true meaning of conversations. It was suspected that the
codes adopted related to items sold in Bynum's other business enterprises, for
example, his clothing store, although other codes were sensed as well. Calls that
may on their face have appeared innocent were accordingly monitored; and as the
investigation proceeded, the intended meaning of earlier calls dawned on the
agents.
Id. at 412-13 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033,
1048-50 (D. Md.), affd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th
Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (100 percent interception for 12 days was not
unreasonable where it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which calls
were innocent until a reliable pattern could be developed); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d
267, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975) (detailing problems agents face
when they monitor coded and confusing conversations).
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the distinction, the court will not find a failure to minimize. 10 0
Thus the Second Circuit allowed interception of 100 percent of the
calls in United States v. Manfredi,'0 where the suspects used a
"narcotics code"'1 and where "some seemingly innocuous calls were
in fact related to the drug conspiracy."' 3 The court failed to see
"how any detailed screening instructions which could effectively
minimize licit telephone interceptions could be devised under these
circumstances."104
(5) Length of time tap has run. Since the monitoring agents
frequently need time to discern a pattern of conversations to
discover which kinds of calls provide evidence and which kinds are
innocent, the courts have excused failures to minimize if the failure
occurred near the beginning of the tap and was later corrected. A
conscientious investigator supervising a tap typically consults with
the monitoring agents on a daily basis and, as soon as he can,
formulates rules for screening out innocent conversations.10 5 But
the formulation of patterns and rules may take some time and a
court may be willing to excuse transgressions if the agents can show
06
that they were trying to formulate a minimization plan.'
100 See United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

101 488 F.2d 588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974). For a
discussion of this case, see note 95 supra.
102 Id.
103 Id.

at 597.
at 600.

104Id. See United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974). But see United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 744-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
affd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974) (failure to minimize even
though code and guarded language was used, and many apparently innocent conversations"
later were found to be pertinent to the investigation).
105 In United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.J. 1973), the agent in charge
formulated minimization rules on the fourth or fifth day of the wiretap (the testimony is
unclear on the date). The court explained:
He placed a card on the recorder with instructions to the monitoring agents not to
intercept "Tony's wife Helen" or "Pat's wife Edith" and, on [the seventh day of the
wiretap] placed two large charts on the wall of the intercept site instructing the
monitoring agents ... on what were considered privileged conversations, and who
was not to be intercepted ....

Instructions ...

were modified from time to time as

the investigation continued.
Id. at 880-81.
106 Although most or all of the calls in the first few days of the Falcone tap presumably
were intercepted, the judge found that the agent in charge had properly minimized:
Under skilled and severe cross examination, confronted by defense counsel with
carefully selected conversations, he readily conceded that on occasion monitoring
agents had not properly minimized a call. Overall, his testimony reflects a good
faith effort on the part of the agents to minimize non-pertinent ... conversations.
Id. at 881. In United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1048-50 (D. Md. 1972), the court
allowed agents investigating a large narcotics conspiracy to intercept all calls for more than
twelve days when the supervising attorney thereafter formulated a set of minimization rules.
After the initial period of continuous interception, the attorney in charge had determined
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(6) Extent of judicial supervision. Where the judge who
approved the original eavesdropping order plays an active role in
the effort to minimize, other courts passing on the minimization
issue in the same case will give considerable deference to the
original judge's participation. In United States v. Bynum 07 the judge
who issued the order and then worked actively with the
investigators in the case actually testified at the minimization
hearing. Commenting on that testimony, the court wrote: "Where
as here it can be found that the Judge carefully and actively
supervised the surveillance, his determination that minimization
was achieved 'is itself a substantial factor tending to uphold the
validity' of that decision."' 10 8 But in United States v. Sisca, 10 9 the
court had no trouble finding a failure to minimize when neither
the responsible investigators nor the authorizing judge made any
effort to devise a plan to screen out innocent conversations." 0
2. Special Situations
There are a number of types of conversations which are
protected from interception by special immunities derived from
the Constitution and from the common law. Some conversations
are protected by legally recognized privileges, and others are
protected by the sixth amendment's right to counsel clause.
Analysis of privileges follows the same general two-step
that calls to ten numbers were not pertinent, and that all pertinent calls to women turned
immediately to talk of narcotics or gambling. Id. at 1048. The monitoring agents were
therefore instructed not to intercept calls to the ten numbers or calls to women when the
conversation did not become immediately pertinent, and the court found that this was an
adequate effort at minimization. Id.at 1050. See also United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 755
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
107 360 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
10' Id. at 414-15, quoting United States v. Becker, 334 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), affd, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972).
109 361 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1008 (1974).
110 The court found a failure to minimize even though 90 percent of the calls later
appeared to be pertinent. Id. at 743, 745. But see United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), where the court declined to suppress when the agents failed to make any
minimization efforts, because the court found that 100 percent interception would have
been reasonable even if the agents had attempted to minimize. The court stated:
[T]he agents could publicly declare their intent to disobey the minimization
provisions of the wiretap order, and yet it is possible that the ultimate interceptions
will be found to have been reasonable. . . . [T]he decision on the suppression
motion must ultimately be based on the reasonableness of the actual interceptions
and not on whether the agents subjectively intended to minimize their
interceptions.
Id. at 756.
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process used with pertinent and nonpertinent conversations. What
conversations are privileged and therefore cannot be used in
evidence? What happens if one or more privileged conversations
are intercepted?
Although conversations between husband and wife, doctor and
patient, priest and penitent, and lawyer and client have all
traditionally been shielded by an evidentiary privilege,"' the
lawyer-client situation has appeared most often in the wiretap
cases. This type of conversation is also the most heavily guarded by
legal protections, since the due process and right to counsel clauses
of the fifth and sixth amendments have been construed to protect
of the lawyer-client relationship in certain
the confidentiality
2
situations.'
Not every conversation between lawyer and client is protected,
however. The privilege exists for the benefit of the client only, and
the lawyer may not claim protection when his incriminating
conversations are intercepted.'13 Furthermore, only conversations
WIGMoRE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN

111 See generally 8 J.

SYSTEM OF

EVIDENCE (McNaughton rev. 1961) §§ 2290, 2291, 2298, 2310, 2321, 2326 (attorney-client);
§§ 2227, 2228, 2232, 2233, 2236-39, 2241 (husband-wife); §§ 2380-2391 (doctor-patient);
§§ 840, 2394 (priest-penitent); FED. R. Ev. 503-06 (1975). Cf A.B.A. MINIMUM STANDARDS

152-58.
While the privileges have traditionally allowed one party to a privileged communication
to prevent the other party from testifying in court to the contents of the communication, the
addition of the wiretapping factor added a third party-the eavesdropper. The first courts
to rule on the application of the privilege against eavesdropping third parties held that the
eavesdropper was free to testify to what he had overheard, because the communication lost
its privileged character when it was intercepted. See Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass.
567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918); Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, cert. denied,
346 U.S. 855 (1953).
This rule, formulated when eavesdropping was infrequent, would have serious
consequences if it were applied in the thousands of present day wiretaps. Clients would be
afraid to speak freely to their lawyers, for instance, for fear that a statement would be
overheard and used against them. The draftsmen of Title III, specifically recognizing this
problem, included 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1970), which provides: "No otherwise privileged wire
or oral communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of
this chapter shall lose its privileged character." Id. This section reversed the rule of Wakelin
and preserves the privacy of communications that are entitled to a privilege.
The Department of Justice explains to its attorneys in its in-house wiretap manual:
[T]he confidentiality of conversations between individuals who stand in the
physician-patient, and
relationship of husband-wife, clergyman-penitent,
attorney-client are protected by testimonial privilege. If a defendant could properly
assert such a privilege against introduction of his conversations when the
Government had obtained evidence of them through normal investigative
techniques, then it was not the intent of Congress to allow the Government to use
these conversations as evidence when obtained through electronic surveillance.
JUSTICE DEPT. MANUAL 35.

12 See generally Note, Government Interceptions of Attorney-Client Communications, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 87 (1974).
113 United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 545-46 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
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that relate to a professional association fall under the
privilege-neither party to the conversation may claim a privilege
for a conversation that relates to ongoing criminal activities where
14
the lawyer is not acting in his professional capacity.
If the reported cases are a good sample, it appears that in most
wiretaps in recent years the monitoring agents have been routinely
instructed not to intercept privileged conversations." 5 Inevitably,
however, some of these conversations occasionally find their way
into the agents' tapes, and the courts have consistently refused to
find a failure to minimize. 1 6 As long as a serious effort is made to
screen out privileged calls, the court will not suppress because the
7
effort was not completely successful."
The marital privilege has been treated in similar fashion. In
one case the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the public interest in
discovering the truth about crime outweighed any social interest in
marital privacy." 8 Although the court would recognize the
privilege as to innocent husband-wife conversations, it would not
suppress conversations that "had to do with the commission of a
crime" 1 9 or that "were with respect to ongoing violations of Illinois
gambling laws.' 2 0 The marital privilege has thus been interpreted
to shield from interception little that would not be otherwise
protected under the minimization section. Husband-wife
conversations are shielded only to the extent that the conversation
legitimately falls within the intimacy of the marital relationship; in
other words, almost anything incriminating can be intercepted, and
if it is protected by the marital privilege, the conversation is
irrelevant and the prosecution would not want to use it anyway.
The doctor-patient and priest-penitent privileges apparently have
114Id. In United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court stated:
"A call from a lawyer to a person is not automatically privileged . . . . The attorney-client
privilege exists where the purpose of the communication is to obtain professional legal advice
. . . not news of others, gossip or criminality." Id. at 417.
' See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United
States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 195 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F.
Supp. 296, 317 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975).
1" United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877,885 (D.N.J. 1973); United States v. Bynum,
360 F. Supp. 400, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
117 In Falcone the court held that the monitoring agents had done an adequate job of
minimization even though agents did not shut off their machines on two calls to a lawyer:
"There were six calls between Del Vecchio and his lawyer's office. Four were minimized in less
than one minute. The two which were not minimized lasted, respectively, one minute, and 40
seconds." 364 F. Supp. at 885.
1' United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S.
143 (1974).
119 Id. at 194.
120 Id. at 195. See also Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communications Privileges,

77 HARv. L. Rv. 730, 734 (1964); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 835 (1948).
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not yet been litigated in the wiretapping context, although one
court noted, in ruling that agents had failed to minimize, that many
12 1
intercepted calls to doctors could easily have been privileged.
The sixth amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel is
22
now interpreted to apply at all critical stages of the prosecution.
Most post-indictment encounters with the police have been held to
be critical stages, and the defendant is entitled to have counsel
present. 12 3 If an indicted defendant divulges incriminating
information to a police informant in the absence of counsel while
the police secretly listen through the use of a wiretap, the
information so obtained is probably in violation of the defendant's
sixth amendment rights, 1 24 is suppressible,'1 25 and may taint other
26
evidence obtained through direct use of the wiretap.'
Conversations between an indicted person and his attorney are
absolutely protected by the fifth and sixth amendments, and the
27
mere interception of such conversations may result in a mistrial.1
Although the indicted person situation has not yet come up in Title
121

United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

122 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1968).
123 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263

(1967); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
124 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The precise holding of Massiah is
confined to the situation in which the police elicit incriminating statements from an indicted
person in the absence of counsel. The police had used a radio transmitter to listen in on a
conversation between the indicted defendant and a former associate who had, unknown to
Massiah, decided to cooperate with the authorities. The Court held that this procedure was
an interrogation and that use of the information in evidence would violate the defendant's
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 206. Use of a police informant
to entice an indicted defendant into making incriminating statements on a wiretapped line
would thus be prohibited by Massiah. This holding might arguably be extended to prohibit
interception of a conversation between an indicted person and an informant, even if the
conversation were fortuitous and the informant did not attempt to elicit incriminating
information.
125 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
126 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
127 Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930
(1955) (use of informant); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 757, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952) (use of wiretap). See State v. Cory, 62 Wash. 2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019
(1963) (presumption that surveillance of attorney-defendant relationship constitutes an
intrusion on constitutional rights; conviction reversed and further prosecution prohibited).But
see United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 535 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 876 (1955) (no
presumption that surveillance is an unconstitutional intrusion on the defense). See also A.B.A.
MINIMUM STANDARDS 154-56.
The Department of Justice instructs its supervising attorneys:

In the event that the electronic surveillance intercepts a communication
between an attorney and client concerning a pending criminal case, that is, a case in
which the client is under indictment, the agent supervising the interception must
immediately shut off the interception equipment and make a notation in the logs
that the conversation was shut off and was not overheard.
JUSTICE DI'T. MANUAL 37 (emphasis in original).
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III litigation, it seems clear that monitoring officers must be
unusually careful when they overhear indicted defendants'
conversations.
C.

128

Techniques

Once it is decided which conversations may not be intercepted,
the monitoring agents must determine as a practical matter how
best to avoid intercepting them. There are basically two methods
available by which to limit interceptions: extrinsic minimization,
which entails intercepting only at specified times, and intrinsic
minimization, which entails determining the content of calls as they
are intercepted, and making an on-the-spot decision as to whether
to continue monitoring them.
Extrinsic minimization can be highly effective if the purpose of
the wiretap is to develop incriminating evidence against one or
more known individuals and if the monitoring agents can maintain
visual surveillance of the telephone being tapped. It is then a
simple matter for the surveillance agent to inform the interception
29
station that one of the suspects has picked up the receiver.1
Intrinsic minimization can then be applied, and the result is likely
to be an extremely precise series of interceptions with very little
overage.
The extrinsic method is not useful, however, if the suspects
are not identified, so that visual surveillance is not helpful, or if
visual surveillance is not possible. The only extrinsic method left
would then be to restrict interception to certain hours of the day. 130
128 See note 124 supra. A clever criminal who fears he is being wiretapped could create
problems for the monitors and grounds for appeal in the future by calling his indicted
friends daily and consulting frequently with his lawyer.
129 In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court approved ofjust
such a method of minimization, even though the wiretap was held invalid for failure to
procure a warrant. The Court stated: "The agents confined their surveillance to the brief
periods during which he used the telephone booth, and they took great care to overhear
only the conversations of the petitioner himself." Id. at 354. In a footnote to the opinion the
Court added: "Based upon their previous visual observations of the petitioner, the agents
correctly predicted that he would use the telephone booth for several minutes at
approximately the same time each morning. The petitioner was subjected to electronic
surveillance only during this predetermined period." 389 U.S. at 354 n.14. See also
United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 317 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.
1975) (extrinsic minimization applied successfully). But see United States v. George, 465 F.2d
772, 774 (6th Cir. 1972) (failure to apply extrinsic minimization to a public telephone booth).
130 See State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 527, 291 A.2d 825, 829, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090
(1972). This technique is of some use when relevant calls are expected to be concentrated
within known hours, or if experience with the individual wiretap shows that certain hours
are productive and others are not. In most cases, however, pertinent calls are made at all
hours of the day; no times can be singled out as more or less productive; no visual
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Curiously enough, the State of New Jersey, which operates
under a statute containing minimization language more restrictive
than the language in Title III,a31 chose the extrinsic method as a
rule of law in State v. Dye. 132 Explaining that the monitors can never
determine when an innocent conversation will turn to
incriminating matters, the court effectively ruled that the monitor
need not ever turn his machine off during the hours prescribed for
interception. 33 The court apparently believed that transcribing
only the guilty conversations is an adequate protection against
34
invasion of privacy.'
It is difficult to reconcile this approach with the New Jersey
statute, which closely follows Titie III. Under the extrinsic
approach, the monitoring agent can listen to and record the
conversations of hundreds of innocent patrons of a public
telephone, if visual surveillance is impractical, while he waits for
the suspect to use the booth. This was the case in Dye. 135 Those
innocent people would never be identified, never notified, and
36
would never know that the police had intercepted their calls.,
surveillance is possible; and extrinsic minimization is impossible. See, e.g., United States v.
James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974), where "calls came in during
all hours of the day and night at the rate of one every ten minutes." Id. at 1022.
131 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-12(f) (1971) uses the words "minimize or eliminate" while
the federal statute uses only the word "minimize." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970).
132 60 N.J. 518, 291 A.2d 825, cert. denie4, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972). Prior to Dye, a New
Jersey lower court had written a comprehensive minimization opinion that adopted the
intrinsic method. State v. Molinaro, 117 N.J. Super. 276, 284 A.2d 385 (1971). This decision
was reversed in light of Dye, 122 NJ. Super. 181, 299 A.2d 750, cert. denied, 62 N.J. 574
(1973), and the New Jersey rule is now clearly extrinsic. The New Jersey legislature has
recently incorporated the Dye holding into its wiretap authorization statute:
Every order . . . shall require that . . . interception . . . be conducted in such a

manner as to minimize or eliminate the interception of such communications not
otherwise subject to interception under this act by making reasonable efforts,
whenever possible, to reduce the hours of interception authorized by said order.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-12(f) (amended June 30, 1975). For a brief explanation of the
amendment, see NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE NEW JERSEY WIRETAPPING
AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CONTROL ACT 22-24.

Although the amended statute encourages extrinsic minimization, it seems clear that
individual prosecutors are free to employ intrinsic methods as well. The Essex County
prosecutor, for instance, "requires his monitors to turn off the tap when nonpertinent
telephone calls are being intercepted." HEARINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMINuSSION FOR
THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE, Staff Report on Essex County, Tab J, at 4 (March 18-20, 1975).
133 60 N.J. at 538-39, 291 A.2d at 835.
134 Id. at 536-37, 291 A.2d at 834.
135 Id. at 523-25, 291 A.2d at 827-28.
136 Justice Douglas, dissenting in the denial of the petition for certiorari, agreed:

Although the authorization order limited the conversations to be seized, the
execution of the order included seizure of all conversations on the telephone over
the period of the wiretap. Such an invasion of privacy is even more horrendous
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The federal courts have spurned the New Jersey approach and
have adopted the intrinsic method as their rule,13 7 supplemented
where possible by extrinsic methods. The federal system is
therefore generally more effective in safeguarding privacy. Instead
of blindly intercepting all conversations within a given time period,
a carefully administered and conscientiously applied program of
intrinsic minimization can screen out most truly private
conversations. 138

Where the intrinsic method is used, agents typically listen
carefully to the first minute or so of the call, and then shut off their
equipment if they determine it is not pertinent. 13 9 The agents may
periodically sample the content of longer calls to make certain that
neither the parties nor the subject matter has changed. 140 If agents
frequently switch the recorders on and off as conversations take
pertinent and nonpertinent turns, however, the taped record
produced will be marked by gaps and jumps. This is clearly a
serious problem, since the statute directs that the recording "be
since it involves a pay telephone in a public place where the majority of users and
conversations, as indicated by the 102 hours of innocent conversations out of the
105 hours of seized conversations, will have no relationship to the alleged criminal
activity. . . . [T]he authorization of the wiretap in the instant case . . . is the
equivalent of a general warrant.
409 U.S. 1090, 1092-93 (1972). The New Jersey statute has recently been amended to
incorporate the holding of Dye. See note 132 supra.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408, 415 (D. Md. 1972). In addition,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently interpreted its wiretap statute to
require intrinsic minimization. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 81'9, 844 (Mass. 1975).
138 See, e.g., United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md.), supplemented, 368 F.
Supp. 757 (D. Md. 1973). Out of 2361 calls intercepted, the prosecution and defense
stipulated that 899 were pertinent and properly intercepted, and 1043 were properly
terminated by the agents. The defendants, however, claimed that 419 more should have
been terminated or terminated sooner. The judge ruled that minimization had been
properly achieved, pointing out that many of the defendants' 419 calls were in fact
terminated at some point, that most involved one of the defendants, and that many were
very short and could not have been shut off before the call ended. The government clearly
made a good-faith effort here to comply with the minimization directive, and was evidently
successful in screening out a high percentage of calls. 363 F. Supp. at 436.
"9 See id. at 436-37; United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 880 (D.N.J. 1973).
140 United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400,413 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Sampling is necessary
to thwart wary criminals who slip a few incriminating statements into a long, chatty, personal
call. The classic example of this kind of call occurred in the investigation which led to United
States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971), and which is universally quoted. The court
cited a conversation which had been intercepted in its entirety, and which ran for 45 pages of
transcript. The conversation was completely irrelevant, except for two pages rightin the middle
where the conversation "turned briefly but pointedly to the conspiracy." 335 F. Supp. at 541.
Although the court in King used this conversation as an example of something which should not
have been intercepted, other courts have mistakenly cited this example to support a contention
that nearly everything should be intercepted because relevant material can appear at any
moment. One such case is State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518,538, 291 A. 2d 825, 835, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1090 (1972). For a discussion of this case, see notes 132-36 and accompanying text supra.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:92

done in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or
other alterations."''
Even if the recording was not actually
altered or edited, and the government can show that this is true, a
defendant could always charge that the recording was not made in
such a way as would protect against alterations. 4 2 It would
therefore appear desirable to have a complete tape, which would
be available only to the judge and to the defendants, for the
purpose of having an edit-proof system. It would not be difficult to
use a voice-actuated recorder, with no playback device and enough
tape to last eight or twelve hours, in addition to the agent's regular
1 43
working recorder, in order to produce the complete tape.
Although recording all conversations would seem to be a
violation 6f minimization in itself, there is no reason, as noted
above, why the definition of interception cannot exclude
court-supervised recordings which are unavailable to the police or
prosecution and which are undertaken solely for the benefit of the
defendants.
D.

44

Remedies

Title III provides a suppression remedy that applies to the
contents of any "communication" which was "unlawfully
141 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1970).
142 Cf. United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357 (M.D. Pa. 1971). The court said in dicta:

"Furthermore, nearly continuous seizure ... of the defendant's phone conversations may
protect the defendant from having these conversations edited to his detriment or having
statements taken out of context." 332 F. Supp. at 1360.
143 Agents frequently make use of a second recorder anyway. The use of additional
machines should not be a significant financial drain, therefore, and no extra manpower
would be needed, since the machine would be unattended and would work with no human
assistance except when tapes have to be changed. Voice-actuated recorders are already in
common use to avoid wasting tape and to relieve the agents of the necessity of switching on
and off for each call. The agents could always play back the tape thus produced before it was
taken away and sealed, but if this problem proves to be serious in practice the recorder could
be placed in an isolated location to which the agents have no access, or it could be sealed
shut, and the tapes changed and removed by a court-appointed representative. The Nassau
County, New York District Attorney's office has confirmed that it uses this dual-tape method
in all its wiretaps.
144 See text accompanying note 65supra.Although the dual-tape method solves the editing
problem, it also raises several other problems. First, agents who find that they mistakenly
minimized an important conversation will certainly apply for a search warrant to listen to that
conversation on the master tape. The warrant should issue upon a showing of probable cause
that a particular conversation will yield evidence, but only if the agents can show that they can
locate the desired conversation without listening to excessive portions of the master tape.
Complete recording is an evil that should be tolerated only to protect the defendant from
editing, and the government should not be allowed to turn this procedure to its own advantage
by listening freely to long sections of the master tape. Second, if a court rules that use of a
nonminimized master tape is a violation of minimization, what is to be suppressed? Clearly, only
the nonminimized tape should be suppressed; the properly minimized tape is lawfully and
independently produced, and so is not a "fruit" of the illegality.
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intercepted" or which was intercepted "not ... in conformity with
the order of authorization."' 1 45 While this language clearly gives the
defendant a right to suppress evidence when there was a failure to
minimize, it is not at all clear how much evidence Congress
intended to be suppressed. A court could either suppress all evidence
arising from a wiretap that produced excessive overage, or it could
suppress only the overage, leaving the pertinent conversations free
to be used in evidence.
The first two cases to consider the question split evenly, one
choosing total suppression, the other deciding on suppression only
46
for improperly intercepted conversations. In United States v. Scott'
the court suppressed all evidence when it found a failure to
minimize. A later case 147 that followed Scott reasoned that if only
improperly intercepted conversations were suppressed, investigators would be free to intercept every conversation in every
case, since they would know that a court would not suppress the
incriminating conversations-the very ones the prosecution would
introduce into evidence. 48 Therefore, the court applied total
49
suppression as a more potent weapon.
Taking a more statutory and historical perspective, the court in
United States v. King5 ° decided to suppress only conversations that
were improperly intercepted. 15 1 Previously, the court reasoned, all
evidence obtained from a search and seizure was to be suppressed
only if the search was void ab initio, and that was not the case with a
valid warrant that had been improperly executed. 15 When officers
executing a valid warrant go beyond the scope of permissible
seizure, the validly seized items are not tainted and may be
introduced in evidence. The invalidly seized items, however, are
1 53
suppressed and in the usual case are returned to their owner.
145

18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970).

146 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971), vacated, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974). On remand,

the district court again ordered suppression, but the court of appeals reversed, 516 F.2d 751
(1975), holding that there had been no failure to minimize and that total suppression was
not the proper remedy in any event.
147 United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972).
148 Id. at 1046-47. Courts usually rule that incriminating conversations were properly
intercepted, so the only conversations improperly intercepted, frequently, are the
nonpertinent, innocent conversations. See text accompanying note 163 infra.
149 Id. at 1047.
1 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971),rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
151 Id. at 543-44.
152 Id. at 544.
153 Id. See also United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 745-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503
F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp.
190, 196-97 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971);
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The court in King found further support for its position by
reference to the language of Title III.' 54 The statute provides that
"any... communication" may be suppressed, 5 5 implying that each
communication is to be treated individually and that the draftsmen
of the statute never intended the suppression remedy to apply in
1 56
blanket fashion to all communications.
In fact, the statute is ambiguous, and judging from the
otherwise precise nature of Title III, Congress would doubtless
have specified the intended scope of suppression had it really had
any intentions. For the second time 157 the courts have encountered
a wiretap situation where there is no real statutory guidance and
where search and seizure precedent is misleading because of the
differences between wiretapping and the traditional search for
tangible evidence.15 8 Perhaps in unwritten recognition of this
problem, the courts have generally applied a practical rule which
combines both partial and total suppression.
Failures to minimize may be divided into two different
categories. In the first the investigators make no effort to minimize,
and every or virtually every conversation is intercepted. 5 9 In the
second, some effort to minimize is made, but the court rules that
the effort is unsatisfactory and that too many nonpertinent
60
conversations were intercepted.
Total suppression has generally been reserved for cases of
total failure to minimize, and partial suppression has been applied
more often to situations where the minimization effort was made,
but was unsatisfactory.' 6 ' A rule combining both types of
United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 300-01 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd on othergrounds sub
nom. United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972).
154 335 F. Supp. at 545.
155 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970).
156 335 F. Supp. at 545.
157 See notes 35-42 and accompanying text supra.
158 See notes 43-54 and accompanying text supra.
159 See, e.g., United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971), vacated, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For the subsequent history of Scott, see note 146 supra.
160 See, e.g., United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 195-97 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
161 LaGorga, George and numerous other cases would fit under this analysis. See notes
159-60 and accompanying text supra. But see United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 744-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974) (total failure
to minimize, but partial suppression applied). As the government became aware of the
penalty for a total failure to minimize, these total failure cases faded away and now some
effort at minimization is nearly always made. The total suppression remedy is therefore rarely
used in the most recent cases. In fact, judicial findings of failure to minimize have also grown
infrequent in the most recent cases as minimization techniques have become more
sophisticated.
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suppression remedy makes a great deal of sense since it applies
graduated penalties to different degrees of infraction. The partial
suppression component, however, is dangerously close to no
remedy at all, and the trial court must apply it diligently if it is to
have any effect.1 62 If partial suppression is adopted, the evidence
to be suppressed should be that which is derived from improperly
intercepted conversations. Before each conversation is received in
evidence, then, the defense must be allowed to object to it on the
63
ground that it was improperly intercepted.1
In addition to suppression, Title III provides for a civil
remedy for anyone whose wire or oral communications are illegally
intercepted, used, or disclosed. 1 64 Any person committing such an
infraction will be liable for actual damages, punitive damages, and
attorney's fees. Actual damages are set at a minimum of $100 per
day or $1,000, whichever is higher. However, good faith reliance
on a court order is specified to be a complete defense to an action
brought under this section.
Each time a judge rules that there has been a failure to
65
minimize, the possibility arises of a civil suit under this section.
162

If the trial court merely offers to suppress nonpertinent information, then partial

suppression will not impede the prosecution, since the government will certainly not offer
irrelevant conversations as evidence. What should be a vindication of the defendant's rights,
therefore, becomes nothing more than a verbal reproach from the bench.
163 If the prosecution attempts to introduce a short segment from the middle of a long
personal conversation, the defense must be allowed to argue that the monitoring agents
should not have been listening to that call at all, and so should never have heard the
incriminating segment. The agents would have been permitted to sample the call, of course,
so the judge must finally decide whether he thinks that under the circumstances the agents
would have overheard the segment if they had been operating lawfully.
164 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
165 In United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
918 (1974), the court stated in dicta that if monitoring agents failed to minimize, the
defendants would have a cause of action against the individual agents under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2520 (1970). It is dear from the language of the statute that any person whose conversation is improperly intercepted would have such a cause of action, but in reality suits by
nondefendants are rarely brought because the people who are unconnected with the conspiracy
never know that their communications have been overheard. They are not arrested and
indicted; they may never be identified; and even if identified, they are usually not notified that
their conversations were intercepted.
Suits by nondefendants against monitoring agents who fail to minimize could become
more frequent if the procedure followed by one district court is adopted. The court in
United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 197 (W.D. Pa. 1971), acting pursuant to a
discretionary power of notification granted in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970), ordered all
persons whose conversations were intercepted to be notified so that they might take
advantage of § 2520 if they so chose. Under § 2518(8)(d), all parties named in the
eavesdropping order must be notified within 90 days after the termination of the
interception that their conversations were or were not intercepted. The judge has
discretionary power to order notification of any other persons as justice may require. See
notes 233-313 and accompanying text infra.
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Curiously enough, however, the civil litigation has been confined to
violations other than failure to minimize. 1 66 Criminal defendants
have not yet made use of the civil remedy, most probably because
of the statutory provision that good faith reliance on a court order
constitutes a complete defense. All the agents need do is point to
some minimization effort, and the court is likely to direct a verdict
for the agents on the ground that they acted in good faith and
relied upon a court order.
II
AMENDMENTS

A. New Crime
Because the subjects of electronic surveillance may engage in
several different criminal enterprises simultaneously, it is not
unusual for monitoring agents to intercept conversations providing
evidence of crimes other than those set out in the warrant. High
level figures in organized crime may engage in gambling, drugs,
loan-sharking, securities fraud, and other offenses,'1 67 so that an
investigation into any one area predictably yields evidence in
others. Recognizing that this phenomenon will occur, the
draftsmen of Title III provided that evidence of a new crime' 68
may be used at trial "when authorized or approved by a judge of
competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent
application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter.' 6 9 This section
creates a statutory plain view doctrine for wiretaps, legalizing the
interception of evidence found within the scope of an otherwise
lawful wiretap, 70 but it reaches further than the traditional
doctrine of plain view.
166 One salient example is the suit by the Democratic National Committee against the
Committee to Reelect the President, arising out of the celebrated Watergate bug. The suit was
brought under § 2520 for violations of § 2511, which prohibits private wiretapping. See N.Y.
Times, June 22, 1972, at 44, col. 1. See also Kinoy v. Mitchell, 331 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (suit against federal officials for illegal surveillance).
167 See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN192-95 (1967).
16sA new crime is one not specified in the authorization order.
16918 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970). Note that the statute conditions admissibility in evidence
on making the application, but does not similarly condition the validity of the original
interception.
170 The plain-view doctrine holds that any evidence that is within the plain view of an
officer executing an otherwise lawful search may be validly seized, even though the items are not
described in the warrant. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Fora discussion of the application of plain view to the wiretap
situation, written before Coolidge and Cady, see A.B.A. MINIMUM STANDARDS 142-45.
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
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Whereas the traditional search is conducted within a short
space of time, the wiretap may extend for months. An officer
executing a search for tangible evidence cannot realistically be
expected to seek judicial sanction each time he enters a new room
of a house and finds evidence not described in the warrant.' 7 1 But
a wiretap monitor might be thought to be executing an
unreasonable search if he continued, day after day, to intercept
1 72
evidence of crimes not specified in the authorization order.
Because' the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, it
may be a constitutional necessity to obtain immediate judicial
approval of the widened scope of interception. The amendment
question is thus of constitutional dimension when the monitoring
officer seeks to continue intercepting evidence of crimes not
17 3
specified in the warrant.
For this reason Title III commands the monitoring officer to
seek judicial sanction for interception of evidence of new crimes "as
soon as practicable."'1 4 Because new crimes appear frequently,
171 For this reason an officer executing a search for tangible evidence acts pursuant to a
single judicial grant of authority contained in the warrant. If the officer sees evidence not
described in the warrant, he may seize it without changing the warrant, and the evidence is
later admissible in all trials. Changing, or amending, the conventional warrant would be
impractical because the search must be conducted within a matter of hours. A wiretap may
extend for months, however, and it is not impractical to amend the wiretap order at intervals
as the situation may require.
172 Since it is impractical to amend a conventional warrant, seizure of an item in plain
view without prior judicial approval is reasonable and therefore permissible under the
fourth amendment. But the plain-view doctrine is only an exception to the usual requirement of
probable cause. When the monitoring agent seeks to intercept future conversations yielding
evidence ofa new crime, there is no reason why he cannot show probable cause and request that
the order be amended. Therefore, failure to amend would be unreasonable, and the
conversations not covered by the order would be intercepted illegally. See note 174 infra.
173 But note that the point is moot if the tap is terminated upon interception of
evidence of the new crime; the search is finished, judicial review would be purely
retrospective, and, as in the case of a conventional search, it would be unnecessary to amend
the warrant.
174 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970). An amendment can serve two distinct functions. First, it can
sanction the past interception of a conversation outside the scope of the order. Second, it can
provide judicial approval of future interceptions of conversations outside the scope of the
order. For the first type of amendment, the judge need only determine that the conversation
was properly in plain view; the original order must have been valid and the agents must have
conducted the wiretap in a lawful manner. For the second type of amendment, however, the
judge is actually granting a new, enlarged authorization order. Therefore, the government
must support its application for this prospective amendment with a showing of probable cause.
The legislative history of § 2517(5) shows clearly that the draftsmen envisioned only the first,
retrospective, type of amendment. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2189. When there is probable cause
to believe that evidentiary conversations outside the scope of the warrant will be intercepted
in the future, however, the Constitution requires a prospective amendment supported by a
showing of probable cause. People v. Di Stephano, 45 App. Div. 2d 56, 60-61, 356 N.Y.S.2d
316, 320-21 (1st Dep't 1974); People v. Di Lorenzo, 69 Misc. 2d 645, 651, 330 N.Y.S.2d 720,
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particularly in investigations of organized crime, and because
overworked police officers and prosecutors frequently do not
immediately file applications with the judge, a number of courts
have had to determine whether a particular amendment was
obtained "as soon as practicable," and, if not, whether evidence
should be suppressed.
The amendment cases fall into two major categories: first,
those cases where surveillance ends substantially at the point where
the new crime- is perceived, and second, those cases where
surveillance continues after perception of the new crime. The first
category presents no problems.
1. Surveillance Terminates
In People v. Ruffino 1 75 the monitoring officers ended the
wiretap shortly after intercepting the first indications of a new
crime. Although a post hoc amendment of the warrant after
surveillance has terminated might seem pointless from a
constitutional viewpoint, the language of the statute requires an
amendment every time the government wants to use at trial
evidence of a new crime, regardless of the circumstances . 76 The
monitoring officers in this case thus should have applied for an
77
amendment immediately, but in fact they delayed for months.'
727 (County Ct. 1971). This prospective amendment would be necessary even though Title
III does not explicitly provide for such a procedure.
This distinction between the two types of amendment can place investigators in a very
difficult position. If they intercept a small number of conversations providing evidence of a new
crime, their experience may give them a "hunch" that a crime is being planned and that more
such conversations will occur. But a mere hunch does not constitute probable cause and the
investigators would be unable to obtain a prospective amendment. At the same time, the defense
could argue that the investigators were knowingly intercepting conversations beyond the scope
of the order and that the search was therefore unreasonable. The New York Appellate Division
accepted this defense in People v. Di Stephano, 45 App. Div. 2d 56,356 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1st Dep't
1974). TheDi Stephano result appears to put New York investigators in a hopeless dilemma, and
the New York County District Attorney has appealed this case to the New York Court of
Appeals. The best answer to the problem is to allow interception of conversations providing
evidence of a new crime until the government first accumulates probable cause. Up to this point,
the conversations would be in plain view and retrospective amendments would be required.
When thejudge determines that the conversations amount to probable cause, he should require
the government to enlarge the scope of the warrant with a prospective amendment. The
prosecutor should not risk suppression simply because he erred in determining the exact point
at which he had enough evidence to obtain a prospective amendment.
"1 62 Misc. 2d 653, 309 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
176 N.Y. CrNi. PRO. LAW § 700.65(4) (1971). This section is substantially identical to the
Title III amendment section, 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970).
177 62 Misc. 2d at 655, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
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Nevertheless, despite the "as soon as practicable" language, the
17 8
court refused to suppress.
Although one purpose of Title III's amendment section 17 9 is to
provide judicial sanction for ongoing interception
of
communications not specified in the warrant, 8 0 the legislative
history shows that the amendment is also designed to give the
judge an opportunity to ensure that the original order was lawfully
obtained, was "sought in good faith and not as subterfuge search,"
and "was in fact incidentally intercepted during the course of a
lawfully executed order."' 8'1 Since surveillance in this situation has
already ended, there is no need to seek judicial approval for
continuing interception of evidence of a new crime, and no
constitutional question is involved. 82 The other aims specified in
the legislative history are a restatement of the elements of the plain
view doctrine: the original order must not have been sought as a
subterfuge when the government's real purpose was to obtain
evidence of the new crime, and the communications must really be
incidentally intercepted while the monitors were looking for
something else.
In the termination of surveillance case, therefore, interception
83
has ended and the amendment can only apply retrospectively.
Since the amendment only sanctions events in the past, failure to
file promptly does not affect the legality of future surveillance and
does not affect any of the defendant's rights. Thus, whether the
government files the amendment as soon as practicable or not
makes no difference. And because neither the legality of the
surveillance nor the rights of the defendant turn on the timing of
the amendment, the "as soon as practicable" language serves no
central purpose in the Title III scheme of safeguards, and a
84
delayed amendment should not result in suppression.
178

Id. at 659, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 811. For a further discussion of this case, see note 184

infra.
179 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970).
180

See notes 171-74 and accompanying text supra.
2189.

181 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
182

111

See notes 173-74 supra.

Nothing in the constitutional logic of plain view requires the officer to submit his

actions for review, after the search, to a judicial authority. Thus, when surveillance
terminates immediately and the only point of an amendment is to allow the judge to

determine that the evidence of the new crime was intercepted in the course of an otherwise
lawfully conducted wiretap, the amendment procedure is only a statutory requirement and is
not mandated by the fourth amendment.
184 The suppression sanction is built into Title III by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a)
(1970). Section 2515 provides that no part of any intercepted communication or evidence
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2. Surveillance Continues
When the tap does not end, the amendment may be important
to sanction interception of further evidence of the new crime. The
matter is not perfectly clear, however, because not every
conversation providing evidence of a new crime in the middle of a
long wiretap will require the officer in charge to seek an immediate
amendment. 8 5 First, a conversation is not a discrete entity which
provides evidence directly attributable to one crime or another.
derived therefrom may be admitted in evidence in "any trial, hearing, or other proceeding"
if disclosure of the information in question "would be in violation of this chapter." Jd.
§ 2515. Section 2518(10)(a) defines what would be in violation of this chapter and grants the
defendant the right to suppressioh on three grounds:
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or
approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the
interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or
approval.
Id. § 2518(10)(a).
The United States Supreme Court discussed the suppression remedy in the companion
cases, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), and United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562
(1974). Read together, the two opinions restrict application of the suppression remedy to
violations of sections that "directly and substantially implement" the congressional intent to
limit and safeguard the use of wiretaps. 416 U.S. at 527; 416 U.S. at 574-75. For a more detailed
discussion of Giordano and Chavez, see notes 265-73 and accompanying text infra.
In the surveillance-terminates case, the timeliness of an amendment is not important
and cannot be a direct or substantial safeguard in the Title III scheme to regulate the use of
wiretaps. See note 183 supra. Under the Supreme Court's analysis, then, failure to obtain a
timely amendment in the surveillance-terminates case should not result in suppression.
People v. Ruffino, 62 Misc. 2d 653, 309 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 1970), illustrates this
principle. The order authorized interception, for a period of 20 days, of communications
relating to narcotics. When the first order expired, the government obtained an
extension, again specifying narcotics, and four days later the agents overheard talk of a
murder set for that same day. Agents arrested the defendants during the murder attempt
and the tap was discontinued. The grand jury returned indictments 12 days later, but the
government did not obtain an amendment to cover the interception of the murder
conversation until three months after the indictments. Id. at 655, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 808. The
defendants seized on the opportunity and moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground that
the government had not obtained an amendment as soon as practicable. The court denied the
motion:
It seems apparent that the purpose the lawmakers had in mind, in requiring an
amendment of an outstanding interception order where new criminal matters . - .
came to light over the wiretap, was to legalize the continuance [of] the wiretap to
discover further evidence of the newly disclosed crimes. Here we are dealing with a
situation where the amending order ... dealt solely with past conversations, since
the wiretap itself was discontinued immediately upon the overhearing of the
"murder" conversation. Under such circumstances ... I hold that the failure to
obtain an amending order as promptly as possible was a mere irregularity which did
not affect ... the prosecutor's right to offer the conversation in evidence. To hold
otherwise would exalt form above substance.
Id. at 660, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 812 (emphasis in original).
I'" See, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764,781-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
866 (1973), where the application for amendment was in effect combined with the application
for extension when the authorized period of surveillance expired.
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The conversation may be ambiguous or may provide evidence of
several crimes, one of which is specified in the warrant, so that the
communication might not be plainly outside the scope of the
order. 1 8 6 Second, a coded conversation overheard near the
beginning of the period of interception may only be understood
long afterward, far too late to seek a timely amendment. 87 Third,
the evidence of a new crime may occur only occasionally, sprinkled
throughout a torrent of properly intercepted conversations relating
to the specified crime. In such cases the officer in charge of the tap
may feel that he is not really looking for evidence of the new crime,
that it is being intercepted too infrequently to worry about, and
that he does not need an immediate amendment.
The cases are further complicated because the government
works with the judge through many channels, and may keep him
informally up-to-date on what kinds of material are being
intercepted. 18 8 In a series of progress reports to the judge, the
government may disclose that new crimes have been overheard, or
the district attorney may make a detailed exposition of new crimes
intercepted when he writes affidavits to support an application for
extension. 18 9 Each of these more or less formal contacts with the
judge is to some degree a request for judicial sanction of
continuing interception of evidence of a new crime, yet none really
complies with the statutory form of a special application to the
186 If a crime is specified in the authorization order, a conversation pertaining to that
crime is validly intercepted under that order. No application for amendment is necessary
even if the conversation provides evidence of other crimes as well. A conversation validly
intercepted under one order could thus be used in a later prosecution for an entirely
different purpose, and such later use cannot affect the validity of the original interception.
187 See, e.g., United States v. Ratenni, 480 F.2d 195, 198-99 (2d Cfr. 1973), where
certain conversations were not understood until after the tap had been terminated. The
court held that "[s]ince the taps had been abandoned there was no necessity to seek a prompt
amendment of the original order." Id. at 199. Accordingly, the government's failure to ask for
the amendment until four months later was not significant and did not call for suppression. See
note 184 supra.
186 One example of rather casual communication between the judge and the officers
executing the surveillance is found in United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 194 (W.D. Pa.
197 1), where thejudge asked for reports on the progress of the tap (under authority granted by
18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1970)), and the special attorney in the investigation submitted his reports
orally rather than in writing. The district court held that oral reports were not a violation of the
statute, since the judge could have dispensed with them entirely, but it noted that "it would be
better practice in the future to have communications submitted in writing.
336 F. Supp. at
194.
189 The district attorney used the applications for extension as a vehicle for informing
the judge of the interception of evidence of new crimes in United States v. Tortorello, 480
F.2d 764, 781-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973). The Second Circuit approved
and ruled that under the facts of the case no amendment at all was necessary. For a more
detailed discussion see notes 199-209 and accompanying text infra.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:92

judge. If the judge does not object when informed on several
occasions that evidence of a new crime is being intercepted, the
prosecutor can later say with some justification that he sought
judicial sanction, that it was tacitly given, and that under these
circumstances failure to file a formal amendment is of no
consequence.
The cases that deal with amendments in the context of
continuing surveillance have generally not analyzed the entire
problem but have restricted their attention to the facts of the case
at bar. Although the result has been a scattering of opinions that
conflict with each other to some degree, 190 it is nevertheless
possible to construct an amendment theory that accounts for most
of the cases.
The inconsistencies in the amendment decisions, as with the
minimization cases, stem largely from the infinite variety of wiretap
fact patterns. The cases lie on a continuum from clearly
inadvertent interception of a single new conversation' 9' to clearly
intentional interception of an unbroken string of new
conversations. From the court's point of view, the spectrum can
stretch from an obviously valid case of plain view to an obviously
invalid case of a subterfuge search.
At the plain view end of the spectrum, there is probably no
need to seek an immediate amendTnent when a single "new
conversation" appears. If the tap has been consistently providing
evidence described in the warrant, and there is no reason to expect
a significant number of similar new conversations, judicial sanction
for further interception of such conversations would be
pointless.1 92 If, however, the tap has not produced the evidence
190 See United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), cdrt. denied, 420 U.S. 990
(1975); United States v. Ratenni, 480 F.2d 195, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 781-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v.
Lamonge, 458 F.2d 197, 199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972); United States v.
Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 681 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v.
Denisio, 360 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296,
316 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975); People v. Di Stephano, 45 App. Div. 2d
56, 356 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1st Dep't 1974); People v. Ruffino, 62 Misc. 2d 653, 309 N.Y.S.2d 805
(Sup. Ct. 1970); People v. Rizzo, 70 Misc. 2d 165,333 N.Y.S.2d 152 (County Ct. 1972); People v.
Sher, 68 Misc. 2d 917, 329 N.Y.S.2d (County Ct. 1972); People v. Di Lorenzo, 69 Misc. 2d 645,
330 N.Y.S.2d 720 (County Ct. 1971).
191 As used in this Comment, a new conversation is one which provides evidence of a
new crime.
192 An example of a case where an immediate amendment should not have been
necessary is United States v. Ratenni, 480 F.2d 195, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1973). In this case the
tap continued in operation for two and one-half months, but the conversations which the
defendants insisted were new and required an immediate amendment occurred on four days
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expected, or if the officer in charge has probable cause to believe
that the new conversation is likely to recur frequently, then an
193
immediate amendment is probably required.
At the subterfuge end of the spectrum is the situation where
great volumes of incriminating material not described in the
warrant appear. 94 Particularly if little or no expected evidence
appears, or if law enforcement officers begin to track down the
leads provided in the new conversations, an amendment or even an
95
entirely new warrant should be required.
A court, in passing on the question of whether the government
obtained a timely amendment, should consider a number of
within the space of a week. In the actual case the monitoring agents did not understand the
conversations until later, so they could not have applied for an amendment at the time. See
note 187 supra. Even if the officers had immediately understood the conversations, the calls
occurred so infrequently and within such a short space of time that they seem to have been
picked up purely incidentally. The government was not interested in the conversations until
later; the agents on the spot apparently did not expect substantial further interception of
similar communications; and the tap had produced useful evidence of the type described in
the warrant. Under these circumstances, the government should not have had to amend the
warrant immediately and could validly have done so at any time after the termination of
surveillance. Nevertheless, the safest course for the government is to obtain the amendment
immediately.
193 If the tap has not produced the evidence expected, then it is susceptible to attack on
the ground that it was a subterfuge search for any evidence of any crime which might turn
up. The government in such cases must protect itself by swiftly moving to amend the order
to reflect the crimes which actually appear. If the officer in charge suspects that the new
conversation is likely to recur frequently, then he must request a prospective amendment
and support the application with a showing of probable cause. See note 174 supra; People v.
Di Stephano, 45 App. Div. 2d 56, 60, 356 N.Y.S.2d 316, 320 (1st Dep't 1974). This case has
been appealed to the New York Court of Appeals and is expected to be decided shortly.
194 Although an immediate amendment was not filed in United States v. Denisio, 360 F.
Supp. 715, 719 (D. Md. 1973), and the court declined to suppress, Denisio is a paradigm of
the situation in which immediate amendment should be required. The authorization order
specified robbery, bribery, and conspiracy, but the agents intercepted nothing but evidence
of bookmaking activities. Six months later federal authorities obtained an amendment for
the first time on the eve of trial. The district court adopted a unique view of the amendment
procedure, ruling that the timeliness of the application bore only on the judge's initial
decision to approve it and did not affect its validity on subsequent review. Id. at 720. This
approach apparently would preclude an appellate review of the timeliness issue and has not
been adopted by other courts which have considered themselves free to inquire into the
timeliness of an amendment.
19- In People v. Rizzo, 70 Misc. 2d 165, 333 N.Y.S.2d 152 (County Ct. 1972), the district
attorney obtained an entirely new authorization order when a new name appeared in
conversations intercepted under the old order. The defendants argued that the old order
had never been properly amended, but the court ruled that a new order
is stronger than an amended warrant. The District Attorney could have chosen to
amend the original warrant to include the evidence derived against this defendant
as a result of the intercepted communications not part of the original warrant. He
chose, however, to obtain a new warrant which, in this Court's opinion, served the
same purpose as an amendment and was, in fact, a stronger document.
Id. at 166, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
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factors. First, the court should evaluate how difficult it was to
distinguish the new conversations from the expected conversations,
how closely the two offenses were linked, how difficult it was for
the agents on the spot to understand the subject matter of
discussion, and whether the new conversations were arguably
pertinent to the originally authorized investigation. This inquiry
would lead the court to determine whether the monitoring officers
should have realized immediately that they were intercepting
material not covered in the warrant. If there was good cause for
confusion in the minds of the agents, then a delay in seeking an
amendment is more easily understood and permitted. However, if
there is reason to believe the agents knew they were intercepting
new conversations, but deliberately chose not to seek an
amendment, then delay is less easily tolerated.
Second, the court should consider the degree to which the
tap's output conformed to the description in the warrant. When
the tap produces the expected information, then the original
warrant appears to be legitimate even if a new crime is uncovered.
But if a narcotics wiretap yields no evidence at all prior to
perception of gambling evidence, or yields nothing but evidence of
gambling, the investigation is actually a gambling investigation
under a narcotics warrant. 19 6 In the most extreme cases, it would
be safest for the government to obtain an entirely new warrant,
97
despite the overwhelming paperwork involved.
196See United States v. Denisio, 360 F. Supp. 715, 719 (D. Md. 1973). This case is
discussed in note 194 supra. In People v. Di Lorenzo, 69 Misc. 2d 645, 330 N.Y.S.2d 720
(County Ct. 1971), the court explained its holding that a failure to obtain an immediate
amendment must result in suppression in the following terms:
The invasion of an individual's right of privacy is not to be lightly condoned,
whether it involves the person himself, his dwelling or his telephone conversations.
It is permissible only when there is probable cause that a crime is being committed.
Thus, when the interception of a conversation discloses that a crime not contained
in the eavesdropping warrant is being committed, an order amending the
eavesdropping warrant should be immediately obtained and surveillance continued
only after a judicial determination of probable cause that the new crime is being
committed.
Id. at 651, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 727. The statement is overly broad in that it appears to
contemplate a bar on interception of all new conversations until an amendment is obtained.
The discussion thus far indicates that there are many situations in which surveillance could
be continued without an immediate amendment, however, and no other court so far has
adopted this court's strict reading of the statutory language. Nonetheless this court is one of
the few to recognize that an immediate amendment based on a showing of probable cause
may in certain situations be a constitutional necessity to legitimize continued interception of
new conversations.
M9 See note 195 supra. When the government amends the order to permit future
interception of new conversations, it is in effect a new order and must show probable cause.
In the most extreme cases, however, the government should protect its case by beginning the
application process anew and requesting an entirely new order.
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Third, the court should consider whether the agents made
efforts to inform the judge that new conversations were being
intercepted. Even if a formal amendment was not filed until after
the end of the tap, the purpose of obtaining judicial approval of
continuing surveillance can be achieved through informal
conversations with the judge, periodic progress reports, or an
application for an extension. 198
Fourth, the court should consider the extent of the delay. If
the amendment was obtained two weeks after the first new
conversation but one month before the end of surveillance, little
harm has been done and the government has obtained advance
judicial approval for a sizeable period of surveillance. If the
amendment is delayed until after the termination of surveillance,
however, the constitutional demand for advance judicial approval
of a search may have been thwarted, and the argument for
suppression is stronger.
Although no court so far has expressly employed these four
factors in its evaluation of an amendment case, many of the cases
would have been decided the same way if the court had done so. 19 9
One of the leading decisions is the Second Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Tortorello.20 0 Interception began under a New York
authorization order that listed a variety of crimes, including grand
larceny. 20 1 Surveillance continued for 149 days under five
extensions of the order.2 0 2 The tap apparently produced useful
See notes 188, 189 and accompanying text supra. Even if the officer in charge of the
wiretap has not filed an application for an amendment, he must make the equivalent of such
an application if he applies for an extension of the period of sur 'eillance. According to 18
U.S.G. § 2518(5) (1970), applications for extension stand on the same footing as applications
for the original order. Thus, all the provisions requiring showings of probable cause and
particular description of the crime apply to applications for extension. If the monitoring
agents intercept new conversations during the first period of surveillance, then it is usually
clear that interceptions of similar conversations may occur in the future. The strict language
of § 2518(4), requiring that orders specify the crime with particularity, would then require
the applicant to detail what evidence had been intercepted in the first period of surveillance.
Moreover, § 2518(1)(f) provides: "Each application shall include the following
information: . .. (f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception .... " Thus, an application
for extension must include a request to add any new crimes to those specified in the first
order, so that the new order meets the § 2518(4)(c) particularity requirement. This duty is
wholly independent of the § 2517(5) amendment requirement, but the extension may in
certain cases take the place of the amendment. See note 189 supra and notes 200-09 and
accompanying text infra.
199 One case which would have been decided differently is United States v. Denisio, 360
F. Supp. 715, 719-20 (D. Md. 1973), discussed in note 194 supra.
200 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
201 Id.
at 770-71.
202 Id. at 771.
19
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evidence of the types described in the original order, but after the
first extension, the agents also began periodically overhearing
evidence that Tortorello was planning violations of federal
securities laws. 203 Representatives of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Justice Department joined the surveillance
team, and interception of the stock fraud conversations continued
throughout the remainder of the tap.2 0 4 The district attorney never
filed an application for an amendment, but he fully informed the
judge of the continuing interception of stock fraud conversations in
each application for an extension. 20 5 On appeal, the court agreed
that the government had supplied enough information to enable
the judge to rule on the tap's lawfulness, and therefore declined to
suppress despite a complete failure to apply for an amendment. 0 6
The defendant further objected that the wording of the six
successive authorization orders was never changed to include
securities violations in the list of designated offenses. The
government responded that a wording change was unnecessary
because the order was issued under New York law, the securities
violations were federal offenses, and grand larceny was the closest
any state offense could come to covering the stock fraud scheme.20 7
The government further pointed out that the extension orders
incorporated by reference the district attorney's affidavits, which
contained a complete statement of the stock fraud conversations.
The court accepted the government's position on this point as
208
well.
Since the judge in this case was given four formal
opportunities to pass on the propriety of continued interception of
the stock fraud conversations, it would appear that the underlying
purposes of the statute were fully satisfied and the court reached
the proper result. For instance, there were no signs that the
original authorization was a subterfuge. It appears from the
opinion that the tap produced considerable evidence of the type
described in the authorization order, and so did not become
primarily an investigation into Tortorello's stock scheme. It would
thus seem that the officer in charge of the tap was justified in
failing to obtain an amendment. Nonetheless, it would have been
better practice, from both the defendant's and the government's
203Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.

at 782.
at 771.

at 781-82.
at 782-83.
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standpoints, for the district attorney to have obtained an
immediate, formal amendment as soon as he. realized that the tap
was likely to continue to collect stock fraud evidence.2 °9
In contrast to Tortorello, at least one court has construed the
language of the statute strictly. In People v. Di Lorenzo,2 10 the court
ruled that an amendment must be sought "immediately" or
interception of the new crime must cease. 2 1' The court's reasoning
is defective, however, for failure to take account of the plain view
exception to the strict requirements of probable cause. 212 To date,
no other court has adopted such an inflexible reading of the
statute.21 3
B.

New Person

The fourth amendment requires that the warrant describe
with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. It does not, however, require the warrant to name the
owner or occupant of the place to be searched. In the wiretap
analogy, the place to be searched is the telephone number, and the
209 Although the applications for extension in Tortorello contained all the information
that would have been contained in an application for an amendment, the application for an
extension neither focuses the judge's attention on an evaluation of the lawfulness of prior
interception of new conversations, nor asks specifically that the judge approve future
interception of similar new conversations. Although the judge in Tortorello made no objection
to the interception of the stock fraud conversations, he may not have been aware that he was
tacitly approving those interceptions; indeed, he never altered the wording of the order to
include stock fraud, nor did he ever take any action that could be seen as positive approval
rather than passive acceptance. An application for an amendment, on the other hand, would
focus the judge's attention on the specific question of whether past interceptions of new
conversations were lawful, and whether he would approve of future interception of such
conversations. The ambiguity of "tacit approval" would be eliminated, and it would be clear
that the judge had considered the interceptions and approved them.
It is now clear that the standard to be used in evaluating the execution of a wiretap is
the contemporaneous perspective of the reasonable agent on the spot. Both in the
minimization and amendment contexts, the court will not impose its hindsight on the officers
who had to make occasionally difficult decisions without time to ponder them. See United
States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (promulgating the contemporaneous
standard in a minimization case). From this point of view, an application for an amendment
while the tap is in progress gives the judge a chance to evaluate the agents' performance
from their contemporaneous perspective. Approval of the application can thus be an
important line of defense for the prosecution if the defendants charge that the tap was not
lawfully executed.
210 69 Misc. 2d 645, 330 N.Y.S.2d 720 (County Ct. 1971).
211 Id. at 652, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
212 When the new crime is intercepted as evidence in "plain view" during the course of
a lawful wiretap, interception need not cease until an amendment is obtained. See notes
191-98 and accompanying text supra.
213 But see United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 990 (1975) (New York law requires immediate amendment of warrant to add new
person).
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things to be seized are conversations of a particular type. Thus
there appears to be no constitutional requirement that the warrant
set out with particularity the names of the persons whose
2 14
conversations are sought.
Title III requires that the order contain "a particular
description of the type of communication sought,"2 15 but only
requires specification of "the identity of the person, if known,
whose

communications

are

to

be

intercepted.12 16

Although

defendants have frequently challenged this dichotomy in the level
of particularity required, the distinction has withstood attack, and
the courts have regularly held that interception and use of
conversations of persons not named in the order is both
21 7
constitutionally and statutorily permissible.

Occasionally, defendants have further maintained that the
amendment requirement applies to the discovery of a new person
as well as a new crime. The courts have rejected.this contention,
however, and have properly ruled that an amendment is only
required in the case of a new crime.2 18 Title III provides that an
amendment is required when a law enforcement officer intercepts
"wire or oral communications relating to offenses other than those
specified in the order of authorization," but makes no mention of
2 19
persons not named in the order.

214 Although the Federal Constitution would not require particularization of the names
of the suspects, New York has added a wiretap analogue to its state constitution which does
make such a requirement. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. However, the New York Court of Appeals has construed this section to permit interception of communications of persons not
named in the warrant. People v. Gnozzo, 31 N.Y.2d 134, 144-45, 286 N.E.2d 706,
711, 335 N.Y.S.2d 257, 264 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). But see United States
v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
215 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(c) (1970).

216 Id.

§ 2518(4)(a).

217 See United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 686-87 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
934 (19Z2); United States v. Iannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171, 177 (W.D. Pa. 1972), affd on other
grounds, 477 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); United States v. LaGorga,
336 F. Supp. 190, 192-93 (W.D. Pa. 1971); People v. Gnozzo, 31 N.Y.2d 134, 286 N.E.2d
706, 335 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
218 See, e.g., United States v. O'Neill, 497 F.2d 1020, 1023-24 (6th Cir. 1974); People v.
Gnozzo, 31 N.Y.2d 134, 286 N.E.2d 706, 335 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943
(1973); People v. Ruffino, 62 Misc. 2d 653, 659, 309 N.Y.S.2d 805, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1970). But
see United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990
(1975).
219 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970) (emphasis added). The New York statute, which is nearly
identical to Title III, requires an amendment when a law enforcement officer intercepts a
"communication which was not otherwise sought." N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 700.65(4)
(McKinney 1971). The New York Court of Appeals has construed this language to mean
only conversations yielding evidence of a new crime:
Where the communication intercepted involves the crime specified in the warrant,
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Since it is often the very purpose of a wiretap to explore the
extent and identity of a conspiracy, the authorization order may
specify conversations of several named suspects, "and others as yet
unknown."2 2 0 In such cases it is clear that conversations of persons
not named in the warrant are precisely the things sought, and it
would serve no purpose to require the agents to obtain an
amendment each time they ascertain a new name.2 2 ' It is clear that
amendments for new names are not required, and that if a
conversation is otherwise validly intercepted, it is not made invalid
because both parties are not named in the authorization order.
III
SEALING

One of the less frequently litigated sections of Title III requires
the government to present the tapes to the issuing judge "immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order," so that
they may be "sealed under his directions. 2 2 2 The presence of the
seal, "or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof," is a
prerequisite to the use of the tapes in evidence. 223 Applications and
the named suspect, and an unknown outside party, . . . the communication is
"sought" and no amendment is required ....
...Thus, the legislative intent was to require amendments where different
crimes are disclosed.
People v. Gnozzo, 31 N.Y.2d 134, 143-44, 286 N.E.2d 706, 710, 335 N.Y.S.2d 257, 263
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S 943 (1973).
220 See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 146 (1974). Although the question in the
case was the construction of the phrase, "and others as yet unknown," and not its validity,
the Court implied that such a grant of authority was proper. Id. at 153-55. See United
States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 917 (1974) (approving use of "others as yet unknown" in the authorization order).
22' Although an amendment is unnecessary each time a new name appears, the
government is under an obligation to add to the order the names it knows when it applies
for an extension. Since the extension is governed by the same rules as the original order, the
government must specify "the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to
be intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a) (1970). If the government is aware of new names of
suspects when it applies for an extension, then this statutory language would require that
those names be set out in the order. Furthermore, if the original language of the order
specifies one or more names "and others as yet unknown," and that language was not
changed when the tap was extended, then new names discovered during the first period of
surveillance would not be subject to interception. The new names would be neither the
names originally specified, nor "others as yet unknown," and neither category in the order
would cover the new names which were not added at extension time. Cf. United States v.
Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 149-58 (1974); United States v. O'Neill, 497 F.2d 1020, 1023-25 (6th
Cir. 1974).
222 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1970).
223 Id.
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orders must also be "sealed by the Judge. ' '22 4 The purposes of the
sealing requirement are to prevent the tapes and documents from
being altered or tampered with, to ensure that the contents remain
corjfidential, and to help establish the chain of custody.2 2 5
Although minor variances from the exact requirements of the
statute will not result in suppression,2 2 6 a more serious infraction
may incur the court's wrath. In People v. Nicoletti22 7 the monitoring
agents failed to present the tapes to the issuing judge for sealing. A
police detective kept the tapes in a locked footlocker in his home,
made duplicate recordings of certain portions, and with the district
attorney and other police officers, made transcripts of the
conversations. 22 8 Although the New York authorities argued that
there was substantial compliance with the statute; that the issuing
judge was told of the storage arrangements; that the tapes were
needed for transcription; and that no secure storage facility was
available, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the violation
2 29
was serious and that the evidence would be suppressed.
224 Id. United States v. Cantor, 470 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1972), addressed the question of
the exact meaning of "sealed by the judge." Instead of sealing the application and order
himself, the judge gave the documents to an agent and told him to place them in an
envelope, seal them, and store them. The agent did so, but did not seal the envelope until
after he had left the judge's chambers. The defendant argued that this procedure was not
what the statute called for, and that only the judge could perform the actual sealing process.
Id. at 892-93. The Third Circuit disagreed. Noting that there was no claim that the
documents had been altered, and that the procedure actually followed conformed to the
statute in all except minor details, the court concluded: "While it would have been more
appropriate, and we recommend it for the future, for the judge rather than the agent to
have sealed the documents, his sealing would not have added to the confidentiality of the
documents."
225 Id. at 893. United States v. Kohne, 358 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 485
F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); People v. Nicoletti, 34 N.Y.2d 249,
253, 313 N.E.2d 336, 338, 356 N.Y.S.2d 855, 858 (1974).
226See United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948
(1972). When the wiretap in this case was completed, the judge who issued the order was on
vacation, and the applicable New York statute directs that the tapes be sealed under the
direction of the "issuing justice." N.Y. CRIM. PRo. LAw. § 700.50(2) (McKinney 1971). The
police waited 13 days and then presented the tapes to another judge to be sealed. The
Second Circuit concluded:
Section 2518(8)(a) [of Title III] provides that in ihe absence of a seal the tapes
might be used in evidence if 'a satisfactory explanation for the absence' is made. A
fortiori, where, as here, the tapes are sealed, a satisfactory explanation for the delay
will allow their use in evidence. We are satisfied that the delay of the police in
delivering the tapes for sealing was entirely excusable . ...
455 F.2d at 122. Accord, Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 849-50 (Mass. 1975). See
also United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 1975) (delay of 14 days permitted);
People v. Blanda, 80 Misc. 2d 79, 362 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (two day delay
permitted); Cranwell, supra note 11, at 254-55.
227 34 N.Y.2d 249, 313 N.E.2d 336, 356 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1974).
228 Id. at 252, 313 N.E.2d at 337-38, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
229 Id. at 252-53, 313 N.E.2d at 338, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 857-58.
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Measured against the potential for abuse, the explanations
offered in this case are patently insufficient. While the parties
charged with custody of the tape recordings were cognizant of
the sealing requirement, they did not present them to the issuing
Justice ...as was their duty. That the issuing Justice was advised

of the custody arrangements will not suffice. While he may have
tacitly approved them, the fact remains that the recordings were
not sealed. .

.

. [D]uplicate recordings could and should have

been made and the originals preserved under seal. 230

Because the police had played and replayed the unsealed originals,
there was a "possibility for human or mechanical error."2 3 ' The
court therefore decided that the statute had been seriously violated
2 32
and that the tapes were improperly admitted into evidence.
IV
INVENTORIES

After surveillance is over and the tapes are sealed, the issuing
judge must order service of an inventory notice on the persons
named in the eavesdropping order. The inventory must include
the fact that the eavesdropping order was issued, the date it was
issued, the period for which interception was authorized, and a
statement of whether or not the individual's conversations were
intercepted. The inventory must be served within ninety days after
termination of the tap. The issuing judge is given discretion to
determine whether to require service of inventories on persons not
named in the eavesdropping order, and any judge of competent
jurisdiction may, upon an ex parte showing of good cause, postpone
2 33
service of any inventory.
The statutory scheme and its demands on law enforcement
officers seem simple and easily complied with. All the officer in
charge of the investigation need do is serve a straightforward
document on a specified group of people plus any other persons
the judge may require. 234 If the officer feels that service should be
230 Id. at 253, 313 N.E.2d at 338-39, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 858 (footnotes omitted).
231 Id. at 254, 313 N.E.2d at 339, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
232 But see United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1974) (improper
sealing procedures may not result in suppression since the sealing process cannot affect the
lawfulness of the original interception).
233 The inventory notice requirements are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
234 The statute places the duty upon the judge to cause service of the inventory, but as a
practical matter the burden falls upon the prosecutor. If the inventory is not served within
the 90-day limit, there is a chance that the wiretap evidence will be suppressed. The
prosecutor thus risks losing his case if he fails to ensure that the judge orders federal
marshals to make service within the statutory deadline.
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delayed for any good reason, he need only request any competent
judge to postpone the deadline, and judges in practice never
refuse.2 35 In theory, law enforcement officers should routinely
comply with this section and inventories should never be the
subject of litigation. In fact, the wiretap cases reveal a sorry record
of frequent noncompliance. 23 6 Officers have often served
inventories beyond the statutory ninety day limit or not at all, and
defendants have been quick to seize on the government's failure as
a ground for suppression. The issues presented by the motion to
suppress in the inventory cases are more subtle than they might
appear. Many of the courts considering this problem have disposed
of it with only cursory analysis and have not considered the
possibilities that post-termination notice may be a constitutional
requirement, 237 that notice may be constitutionally required to
persons not named in the authorization order despite the judge's
apparent discretion, and that different varieties of failure to
provide notice present different issues. 23 8
Although the literal language of the fourth amendment makes
no requirement of either pre- or post-search notice, the common
law and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure both make some
kind of notice requirement. 23 9 The reason, evidently, is that secret
searches are alien to the democratic tradition and notice to persons
facing criminal prosecution is a fundamental element of due
process.2 40 Thus the cases that consider the constitutional
235 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).

236 It is easy to speculate on why violations occur. Officers manning a wiretap
investigation are usually overworked and may simply forget to serve inventories. For a
description of how much work is entailed in the day-to-day execution of a wiretap, see
United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 880-81 (D.N.J. 1973). Sometimes the defendants
learn of the wiretap through their own sources of information, move for discovery or
suppression and thus reveal their awareness of the tap, and the investigating officers may
assume service of the inventory is unnecessary. See, e.g., United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d
1143, 1144 (8th Cir. 1972).
237 Significant consequences result from a decision that the inventory notice provision is
of constitutional dimension. See notes 243-46 and accompanying text infra.
238 In United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1971), for instance, the court
dismissed the defendant's contention that the inventory had been filed late:
Existing practice with regard to returning and filing search warrants is persuasive
authority for determination of procedures under § 2518. The return and filing of a
search warrant are ministerial acts, . . . and absent a substantiated claim of
prejudice, failure to file a warrant should not invalidate an otherwise lawful search.
Id. at 616.
211 See A.B.A. MINIMUM STANDARDS 91-92. Cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38-39

(1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1958) (discussing requirements that
officers announce identity and purpose before entry to make search); FED. R. GRIM. PRO.
41(d) (requiring officer to give copy of warrant to person whose premises were searched).
240 The senate report accompanying Title III states:
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implications of notice in the wiretap situation indicate that
post-termination notice is a factor bearing on the reasonableness,
and therefore constitutionality, of the wiretap. 41
Although the Supreme Court in Berger did not hold plainly
that notice is a constitutional requirement, it listed a number of
apparently constitutional objections to the permissive New York
statute. Concluding the list, the Court stated:
Finally, the statute's procedure, necessarily because its success
depends on secrecy, has no requirement for notice as do
conventional warrants, nor does it overcome this defect by
requiring some showing of special facts .... Nor does the statute

provide for a return on the warrant thereby leaving full
discretion in the officer as to the use of seized conversations of
innocent as well as guilty parties. In short, the statute's blanket
grant of permission to eavesdrop is 2 without
adequate judicial
42
supervision or protective procedures.
A recent opinion from the Ninth Circuit treated this language as
establishing a constitutional notice requirement,2 43 and the
legislative history of Tide III reveals that the congressional
244
draftsmen interpreted Berger in the same way.
Although the constitutional requirement would certainly be
fulfilled by prompt post-termination notice to all persons whose
communications had been intercepted, no one has argued that the
Constitution sweeps this broadly. Title III fashions the requirement
along more restricted lines.24 5 Since there is no reason to suppose
[T]he intent of the [notice] provision is that the principle of post-use notice will be
retained. This provision alone should insure the community that the techniques are
reasonably employed. Through its operation all authorized interceptions must
eventually become known at least to the subject.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2194.
Commenting on their prototype of the Title III notice requirement, the A.B.A.
Minimum Standards group wrote: "The principle . . . should itself always remain that
post-use notice would have to be given at some time. The possibility of surreptitious
surveillance is, of course, the most telling objection to any system ofpermissive use." A.B.A.
MINIMUM STANDARDS 161.
241 It would appear that in the literal context of the Fourth Amendment,
post-search notice of an electronic interception may properly relate only to the issue
of 'reasonableness' in the conduct of 'searches and seizures.'...
... [T]he constitutional standard for searches and seizures relating to both
tangible objects and communications is the reasonableness of the governmental
action. Only unreasonable searches and seizures are beyond the constitutional pale.
United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 500 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
See United States v. Whitaker, 474 F.2d 1246, 1247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953
(1973).
242 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967).
243 United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1974).
244 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2161-62.
245 Notice must be served within 90 days on persons named in the authorization order.
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that the Constitution requires more than actual notice, it is possible
to violate the statute without violating the Constitution. If the
inventory is not in the prescribed form, or if it is not served within
the ninety day limit, the government has violated the statute, but
actual notice, whether from an inventory or from some other
24 6
source, should nonetheless comply with the Constitution.
When the government fails to serve the inventory on time, the
courts have been faced with the dilemma of either permitting a
clear violation of the statute or declaring that a wiretap that was
valid when executed became invalid through the operation of a
condition subsequent.2 4 7 The courts have understandably been
very reluctant to allow a violation that occurred after the wiretap to
cause suppression of all the evidence previously acquired by valid
means; the violation seems minor, the cost of gathering the
evidence might have been great, and the government might not
have a case if it could not use the wiretap tapes in evidence.
Nevertheless, several courts have decided that some violations were
too blatant or too important to permit and have ordered
248
suppression.
The cases can best be discussed in five different categories
according to their facts.
A.

Lengthy Postponements

In some cases defendants have requested suppression on the
ground that the judge repeatedly postponed the deadline for
serving the inventory. In one case notice was postponed until six
months after the termination of surveillance, and the defendants
argued that the judge had abused his discretion by permitting
notice to be so delayed. 2 49 In this and in similar cases, however, the
The judge may exercise his discretion to postpone the deadline for service, however, and
may order service of notice on other persons. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(d) (1970).
246 One court has stated that the fourth amendment requires notice
including at a minimum all the information contained in a subparagraph 2518(8)
(d) inventory notice given promptly after the decision to obtain an indictment has
been made. What constitutes "promptly" should focus on whether the individual
has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare an adequate response to the
evidence derived from the interception.
United States v. Chun, 386 F. Supp. 91, 93 (D. Hawaii 1974).
247 See United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 499 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
918 (1974).
248 Out of the 13 cases from New York and the federal courts dealing with some facet
of notice, only three have ordered suppression: United States v. Donovan, 513 F.2d 337 (6th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Chun,
386 F. Supp. 91 (D. Hawaii 1974).
249 United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 601 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
936 (1974).
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appellate courts have refused to find an abuse of discretion and
have agreed that the delay was justified. 250 The reason for lengthy
delays most frequently cited is that an ongoing investigation
necessitates continued secrecy. 25 1 Successive overlapping wiretaps
of related persons also constitutes good cause for delaying
service. 252 If the first suspect were notified that his telephone had
been tapped, he would quickly transmit that fact to the others, and
the ongoing wiretaps would be useless.
Excessive postponement for no good cause, however, might
well warrant a court to find an abuse of discretion and order
suppression. The Third Circuit in United States v. Cafero253 warned
that judges "should exercise great care" in granting extensions
beyond the ninety-day period. 5 4 Law enforcement officers seeking
to secure convictions should not request postponements unless they
can show a legitimate reason for delay. Postponements are not a
violation of the statute per se since the judge is granted discretion in
this regard, but defendants can always challenge the exercise of
discretion. The prosecution has won so far, but administrative
convenience or overworked staff are arguments unlikely to
persuade a skeptical appellate court that an inventory could not
have been served within ninety days.
B.

Late Service
In this category of cases the inventory is not served within the
ninety-day limit or within the eventual limit established by judicial
postponement, but it is actually served. Late service is a clear
violation of the statute, but is probably not a constitutional violation
because actual notice is provided. 25 5 Decisions in this category have
appeared regularly throughout the history of Tite III, and courts
have just as regularly declined to suppress. 256 On the whole,
250 See, e.g., United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 500 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417

U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 436 (D. Md. 1973); United
States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
251 See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
552 See, e.g., United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 436 (D. Md. 1973).
253 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
254 Id. at 500.
255 Although the fourth amendment has been read to require notice, the notice need be
in no particular form and must simply be sufficient to afford the individual a reasonable
opportunity to prepare an adequate response to the evidence derived from the wiretap. See
United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 538 (9th Cir. 1974).
216 See, e.g., United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143, 1144-46 (8th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246 (D. Minn. 1973), affd on other grounds, 508 F.2d 1200 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975); United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612,
616-17 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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however, the rationale used to support their refusal to suppress has
been very weak.
Earlier cases made an analogy between the wiretap inventory
and a search warrant return, reasoning that the analogy was
proper because both documents were filed after the search had
been made.2 5 7 Since the search warrant return is universally held to
be a mere ministerial duty,2 58 several courts reasoned that the
inventory is also a ministerial duty, and suppression would not
follow unless the defendant could show prejudice resulting from
the delay. 25 9 The analogy is defective, however. Whereas a search
for tangible evidence is normally preceded by notice, leaving the
post-search return of secondary importance, the wiretap inventory
is the first and only notice given. The tap must be secret while it is
in progress, so the lack of pre-wiretap notice places far greater
significance on the post-wiretap notice procedure.2 60 Because the
search warrant return does not inform the persons involved for the
2 61
first time, it has not been thought to be constitutionally required,
but the Supreme Court has held that post-termination wiretap
notice is of constitutional dimension. 262 The inventory provisions
of Tite III, therefore, cannot be dismissed as ministerial duties,
because those provisions were included in the statute to satisfy a
26 3
constitutional requirement.
A much better view is to recognize that both constitutional and
statutory authority govern the inventory, and that a late inventory
is a violation of the statute but probably is not a violation of the
Constitution. 2 64 Not all violations of Title III warrant suppression
of evidence, however, as the Supreme Court has recently made
clear in United States v. Giordano265 and its companion case, United
2 66
States v. Chavez.
These two cases, although addressing a different section of
257 See, e.g., United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 499-500 (3d Cir. 1973).
258 See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976
(1957); United States v. Avarell, 296 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (two and one-half
year delay in filing a search warrant return and inventory permitted).
29 The language in United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1971), is
typical. See note 238 supra. See also Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 848-49 (Mass.
1975).
260 See United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 537 n.6 (9th Cir. 1974).
261 United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 499 (3d Cir. 1973).
262 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967). See United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d
533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1974).
263 See notes 242-44 and accompanying text supra.
264 See note 255 and accompanying text supra.
265 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
266 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
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Title III, provide a blueprint for determining whether a particular
violation should lead to suppression. The court ruled that if the
section violated does not "directly and substantially 267 implement
Title III's scheme to prevent abuse of wiretaps, 2 68

then the

violation should not result in suppression. 2 69 If the section is a
central safeguard, then violation of that section may warrant
suppression, but further inquiry is necessary. The Court's second
consideration is whether the section's purpose has been satisfied
despite the violation-in other words whether there has been
substantial compliance with the statutory purpose. 27 0 If the matter
is still not settled, at least one court reads Chavez to suggest that
inquiry may progress to whether the government intentionally
violated the section, and if so, whether the purpose was to gain a
tactical advantage.

27 1

In United States v. Chun2 72 the Ninth Circuit held squarely that
the inventory provision of Title III "is a central or at least a
functional safeguard in the statutory scheme.

'2 73

The court based

its holding on the constitutional necessity of notice and the peculiar
necessity of post-search notice in the wiretap situation to avoid
secret searches. 27 4 This conclusion renders suppression possible
and necessitates consideration of the second criterion.
It is because of this second inquiry-whether the statutory
purpose has been achieved-that the courts have been correct in their
refusal to suppress due to late service. Whether or not the inventory
was served precisely within the statutory limit is usually of no moment
whatsoever to the defendant, and the statutory purpose-actual
notice-is satisfied when the inventory is served.
It is possible, of course, that service could be delayed so long
that the defendant is prejudiced in his defense. 7 5 In such a case
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974).
See the discussion of the Giordano-Chavez analysis in United States v. Chun, 503
F.2d 533, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1974).
269 United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1974).
270 Id.
271 United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1974).
272 503 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1974); 12 HousT. L. REv. 760 (1975).
273 Id. at 542.
274 Id. at 536-37, 542 n.19.
275 Prejudice could be caused by late notice in a number of ways. First, the defendant
might simply not have enough time to analyze the wiretap evidence and make his objections
in timely fashion. Second, his memory of the actual events could have dimmed, or he may
have destroyed documents or files which would have been helpful in refuting the wiretap
evidence. Third, if the defendant feels he has inadequate time to analyze the evidence
before trial, he will normally request a postponement of the trial date. If the indictment was
initially delayed, and the postponement was due to the government's failure to serve timely
267
268
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the statutory purpose would not have been adequately fulfilled,
and the courts have generally agreed that suppression would be
proper.276 The statutory purpose has probably been satisfied if "the
individual has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare
an adequate response to the evidence which has been derived from
2 77
the interception.
In sum, the inventory requirement of Title III is a central or at
least functional part of the statutory scheme, and a violation of its
provisions may lead to suppression. In the absence of a showing of
prejudice, however, late service of the inventory still provides
actual notice, satisfies the constitutional and statutory purpose, and
renders suppression unnecessary.
C. No Service
Complete failure to serve the inventory falls under the same
analytical framework as late service. The result is different,
however, because failure to serve provides no notice at all and so
cannot achieve the statutory or constitutional aim. Suppression
must follow, therefore, unless it is clear that the defendants had
actual notice from other sources. 278 Actual notice, even from a
source other than a formal inventory, satisfies the statutory purpose
notice, the defendant may have a claim that the delay violated his due process or speedy trial
rights under the fifth and sixth amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Daneals, 370 F. Supp.
1289 (W.D.N.Y. 1974) (excessive preindictment delay due to inaction or misconduct by the
government is prima facie prejudicial); United States v. Wilson, 357 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa.
1972), appealdismissed, 492 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 908 (1974) (delay
of 16 months between completion of investigation and indictment unreasonable, despite
government's claim that the time was needed to organize the evidence in the case); United
States v. Rutkowski, 337 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (delay of nearly five years unreasonable). But see United States v. Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 839 (1974) (delay of more than three years not unreasonable even though
defendants asserted dimming of memory and a missing helpful witness); United States v.
Pritchard, 458 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 911 (1972) (four and one-half year
delay not unreasonable when defendant was only able to allege prejudice in conclusory
fashion).
276 See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
277 United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 538 (9th Cir. 1974).
21 Although the point has not been specifically litigated, the government should carry
the burden of persuasion on the issue of actual notice; since the notice issue arises only
through the government's failure to comply with the statute, the prosecution should not be
permitted to use its violation to its own benefit.
Since a motion for discovery or for suppression would appear on the record on appeal,
the appellate court may frequently be certain that the defendants actually had timely notice.
But if the record does not reveal facts sufficient to determine actual notice, the best practice
would probably be to remand for a hearing, with the government carrying the burden of
proof. For cases in which the defendants clearly had notice from other sources, see United
States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143, 1144 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kohne, 358 F. Supp.
1053, 1057 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).

1975]

WIRETAPS

and remedies a failure to serve.279 It seems clear, however, that
suppression should result
when there is neither actual notice nor
280
service of inventory.
In Chun, currently the leading case in this area, no formal
inventories were ever served. 281 The Ninth Circuit determined that
the defendants were entitled to actual notice, and remanded to the
district court to determine "whether the underlying statutory
purpose behind the § 2518(8)(d) formal notice provisions has been
satisfied in spite of appellees' failure to receive such formal
notice. 28 2 On remand the district court ordered suppression
because it found that the defendants did have actual notice, but not
within the statutory ninety-day period.283
Although the court of appeals opinion is well reasoned, the
conclusion of the district court seems plainly wrong. Actual notice
is a substitute for and stands on the same basis as formal inventory
notice.2 84 The purpose of both formal and actual notice is to

prevent secret searches and to give the defendant an opportunity to
prepare his defense.285 If the defendant is not prejudiced, delay in
service of formal notice should not be grounds for suppression.28 6
Actual notice should be governed by the same standard, and
279

In United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1972), two defendants were served

late and one was never served at all, and the district court ordered suppression of the
wiretap evidence. The Eighth Circuit reversed, noting that the record showed that the
defendants had ample actual notice. After arraignment, the defendants' counsel were given
an opportunity to inspect and copy transcripts as well as the actual tapes. Counsel for each of
the defendants thereafter received copies of the application, affidavit, and order of
interception, and the defendants were able to make a timely motion to suppress. Id. at
1144-45. The court concluded:
Arguably, then, when a person has actual notice that his conversations have been
intercepted, both the statutory and constitutional requirements have been
substantially complied with.... We do not believe that the use of formal inventories
is an end unto itself. Surely neither the Congress nor the constitution would require
such emphasis of form over substance.
Id. at 1145-46.
280 Title III actually requires the government to give the defendant notice twice. The
first time is the inventory required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970). The government must
also furnish the defendants, not less than ten days before trial, with copies of the court order
and application udder which the order was obtained. Id. § 2518(9). A total failure ever to
give the defendants notice would thus render the evidence inadmissible for violation of both
sections. If the defendants do not receive notice until it is too late to prepare an adequate
defense, then they may ask for a postponement of the trial, or attempt to prove prejudice
and thus obtain suppression. See note 275 supra.
281 503 F.2d at 536.
282 Id. at 542 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970)).
283 United States v. Chun, 386 F. Supp. 91, '95 (D. Hawaii 1974).
284 United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1972).
285 See note 240 and accompanying text supra.
286 See notes 255-77 and accompanying text supra.
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should be sufficient to satisfy the constitutional and statutory
requirements if it is sufficiently prompt to permit a reasonable
opportunity to prepare an adequate response to the evidence.
The district court in Chun specifically found that there was
"insufficient evidence to sustain any of the claims of prejudice. ' 28 7
As in the delayed service situation, actual notice coupled with lack
of prejudice should not result in suppression. The Chun court's
decision to suppress is therefore incorrect, even though actual
notice fell outside the ninety-day limit. The suppression remedy
should be reserved for cases in which the defendants either were
given no actual notice at all or can show that notice was received so
late that their ability to analyze and attack the wiretap evidence was
288
impaired.
D. Deliberate Failure to Serve
The problems considered up to this point arose because law
enforcement officers inadvertently or mistakenly failed to comply
with the statute. In two recent cases, however, the violation of the
statute was deliberate. People v. Hueston2 8 9 and United States v.
Eastman2 9 0 originated from the same wiretap, but on identical facts
the New York Court of Appeals and the Third Circuit reached
opposite conclusions.
The violation arose from the express language of the
authorization order, which purported to waive the notice
2 91
requirement entirely. The defendants received no inventories
and moved to suppress in both the state and federal actions on the
ground that the language of the order violated the statute and
2 92
rendered the order void.
287 386 F. Supp. at 94.

28 The existence of actual notice is frequently inferred from motions for discovery or
motions to suppress. See note 278 supra. Defense counsel should be aware, therefore, that if
he chooses to attack the wiretap evidence by any pretrial motion, he may be giving up any
chance to press a claim that he did not receive timely notice. It might appear that the
defense counsel could, in the event of a failure to serve an inventory, intentionally make no
motions for discovery or suppression to press a claim that he was not given timely notice.
This subterfuge is not likely to be popular, however. A motion to suppress on any of several
other grounds, such as minimization or amendment, is usually far more likely to succeed
than a claim of lack of notice, and the defense counsel would run grave risks of
compromising his client's case if he purposely passed up opportunities to inspect the
evidence in order to preserve an uncertain, bogus claim.
289 34 N.Y.2d 116, 312 N.E.2d 462, 356 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
947 (1975).
290 465 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972).
292 34 N.Y.2d at 119-20, 312 N.E.2d at 463, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76; United States v.
Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1972).
29234 N.Y.2d at 119, 312 N.E.2d at 463, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 275; United States v. Eastman,
465 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1972).
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The Eastman court accepted this argument, reasoning that
wiretapping is an invasion "of privacy that must be conducted in
strict conformity with the letter of the law. 293 The Third Circuit
affirmed, ruling that:
The touchstone of our decision on this aspect of the case at bar is
not one in which an inventory was delayed but rather is one in
which specific provisions of Title III were deliberately and
advertently not followed. In other words the failure to file the
notice or inventory is no mere ministerial act. It resulted from a
judicial act which on its face deliberately flouted and denigrated
the provisions of Title III designated294for the protection of the
public. This we cannot countenance.
The New York Court of Appeals in Hueston considered the
Third Circuit's opinion but did not agree. The inventory
requirement of Title III does not require any particular set of
words in the warrant, the court said, but rather guarantees actual
notice to the defendants that they have been the subject of
electronic surveillance.2 95 The waiver of notice in the warrant was
of no importance, the court held, because the language was
contrary to statute and a nullity, and the only crucial question was
whether the defendants actually received notice. "In short, the
guarantee we are concerned with here applies to the notice itself,
not to the wording of the warrant; and consequently, to suppress
2 96
the evidence, a defendant must show a failure of notice.
Since the defendants had indisputably moved for discovery of
the affidavits, application, and order within ninety days after the
termination of surveillance, the court concluded that the
defendants had actual notice within the statutory limit despite the
failure to serve the inventory, and the purpose of the statutory
notice requirement had been fulfilled.2 97 The court therefore
differed with the Third Circuit and held that the wiretap evidence
2 98
was properly admissible.
Although the Hueston court considered and rejected the Third
Circuit's approach, on balance Eastman is the sounder view. The
New York court treated the intentional waiver case as though it
were no different from an unintentional failure to serve notice,
and would evidently resolve both on a simple determination of
293 United States v. Eastman, 326 F. Supp. 1038 (M.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1057

(3d Cir. 1972).
294 465 F.2d at 1062.
29534 N.Y.2d at 119-20, 312 N.E.2d at 464, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 120, 312 N.E.2d at 464, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
298 Id. at 123, 312 N.E.2d at 465, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 277-78.
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actual notice. There are sound reasons why the two situations
should not be treated in the same way, however. One of the
original purposes of the suppression rule was to curb government
lawlessness by providing some meaningful penalty, as well as to
give the defendant a means of vindicating his rights.2 99 Justice
Brandeis's warning that "[i]f the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law" 300 is nowhere more pertinent than to
wiretapping and Title III. The potential for intrusion on individual
privacy and wholesale violation of constitutional rights is nowhere
greater, and the Title III safeguards must be zealously applied. 30 1
If inadvertent failures to comply with the statute can be cause for
suppression, 30 2 then surely a demonstrated advance intent to
ignore the law is an even clearer case, even if the defendants
chance to learn of the tap on their own. Judges should not be
permitted to waive or ignore clear statutory safeguards simply
because later events rendered the judges' actions harmless.
E. Persons Not Named in Authorization Order
According to the letter of the statute, the inventory
requirement is mandatory only for those persons actually named in
the authorization order. 30 3 The judge may order notice to such
other persons as he "may determine in his discretion .

.

. is in the

interest of justice. 3 °4 Until recently this provision has been upheld
as constitutional and has generally barred motions for suppression
on the lack of notice ground when made by persons not named in
the order.

30 5

299 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
300 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion, Brandeis,

J.).

301 The tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken
place in the last century have made possible today the widespread use and abuse of
electronic surveillance techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy of

communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques of surveillance.... No
longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be left
alone.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2154.

302 An inadvertent failure to minimize can be a ground for suppression, for instance, if
the monitoring officers do not take affirmative steps to develop a minimization plan. See note
110 and accompanying text supra.
303 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
304 Id.

3o- Accord, United States v. Rizzo, 492 F.2d 443, 447 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 944
(1974); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 498-99 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
918 (1974). Contra, United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd,
474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
One district court wrote simply:
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WIRETAPS

The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chun for the first time
challenged the proposition that only those named in the order
must be served, and raised serious doubts about the validity of the
discretion provision. 30 6 Basing its decision on a constitutional
guarantee of notice, and reasoning that "the unnamed but
overheard are also entitled to Fourth Amendment protection," the
court held that the right to notice extends to all those whom the
government proposes to indict, even if they are not named in the
warrant. 30 7 On the statutory level, the court ruled that implicit in
the grant of discretion to the judge is a requirement that the
government furnish the court with accurate and complete
information as to whose communications were intercepted and who
30 8
is to be indicted.
Although the Chun opinion is in the minority,30 9 it is the most
critical evaluation to date of notice to unnamed persons, and its
reasoning is persuasive. If there is a constitutional guarantee of
notice, it should at a minimum apply to prospective defendants, for
the defendant is most in need of time to prepare his case and
analyze the evidence against him. In the case of a wiretap, where
the tapes may run for hundreds of hours and transcription and
analysis may take thousands, it may take months for a defendant to
prepare motions to suppress, and prompt notice is thus essential to
As this section reads, the issuing judge, in his discretion, need only serve inventories
on those persons named in the order; he is not required to serve inventories on all
persons whose calls were intercepted. Defendants have shown nothing to indicate
Judge Watkins abused his discretion by serving only the defendants named in the
orders.
United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 435 (D. Md. 1973).
The government may not evade the notice requirement by purposely omitting names
from the order. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a) (1970); United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996,
1003-04 (4th Cir. 1975).
306 503 F.2d at 537.

Id. at 536-37.
308 To discharge this obligation [of exercise of discretion] the judicial officer must
307

have, at a minimum, knowledge of the particular categories into which fall all the
individuals whose conversations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise
identification of each party to an intercepted communication is not required, a
description of the general class, or classes, which they comprise is essential to enable
the judge to determine whether additional information is necessary for a proper
evaluation of the interests of the various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial
officer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory, it is abundantly clear that
the prosecution has greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted
communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing upon the latter the duty to
classify all those whose conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit this
information to the judge.
Id. at 540 (footnote omitted). Accord, United States v. Donovan, 513 F.2d 337, 342-43 (6th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Swanson, 399 F. Supp. 441, 444 (D. Nev. 1975).
309 See cases cited in note 305 supra.
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an effective defense. 3 10 Although the statute distinguishes between
those who are named in the order and those who are not, it is clear
that defendants in both classes have equal need of notice. The
Chun opinion does not declare the discretionary portion of the
inventory requirement unconstitutional, but it is difficult to see
how that section can stand unless it is read to require the judge to
use his discretion to ensure that each prospective defendant has
actual notice. 3 1 '
The second branch of the Chun opinion is equally persuasive.
The statute imposes upon the judge, not the prosecutor, the duty
of instituting service of inventories and determining who should be
served. The information that the judge needs for his determination
is usually within the sole possession of the law enforcement
authorities, however, and a requirement that the government fully
inform the judge of the changing status of the persons affected by
the wiretap seems necessary. 31 2 If the government withholds
information from the judge, notice may not reach those who
should receive it, and the statutory purposes would be thwarted.
CONCLUSION

The Constitution and Title III govern the execution of wiretaps
and set standards for conduct of government agents during
electronic surveillance. Agents should be aware that they must
carry out four major post-authorization duties, and that failure in
any one of them may result in suppression of part or all of the
wiretap evidence. Agents must minimize interception of
nonpertinent conversations, amend the eavesdropping order
under certain circumstances, seal the tapes upon termination of the
tap, and cause service of a statutory notice upon certain
individuals. Each of these duties serves to protect the rights of the
suspects and of the general public, but each presents legal pitfalls
for the careless government agent.
The definition of the statutory term "interception" is a critical
310 See note 275 supra.

"' See United States v. Donovan, 513 F.2d 337, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1974). Chun held that the notice served on unnamed
persons contain "at a minimum" all the information contained in a formal inventory. Id. at
537-38. To arrive at this position, the court must have believed that the contents of the
formal inventory amount to the constitutional minimum for actual notice. This definition of
actual notice should be weighed carefully when other courts determine whether a defendant
who did not receive an inventory nevertheless had actual notice.
31 See note 308 supra.
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threshold question in a discussion of minimization. Although the
statute is ambiguous and the cases have dealt poorly with the
problem, the only workable definition is that both overhearing and
recording constitute an interception. The courts have generally
construed the minimization requirement to mean that agents must
make a reasonable effort under the circumstances to minimize
interception of nonpertinent conversations. Reasonableness is
evaluated on a case-by-case basis using the perspective of the agent
on the spot, and the courts have generally used up to six major
variables to evaluate the agents' practices in each case.
Although Title III provides for a suppression remedy, the
statute does not specify how much evidence is to be suppressed
when agents fail to minimize. Suppression of all evidence is used
rarely, and is reserved for cases of total failure to minimize. When
agents attempt to minimize but fail, the courts more often suppress
only the improperly intercepted conversations.
When agents intercept evidence of a "new crime," they may be
required to obtain an immediate amendment of the eavesdropping
order. This duty does not apply to interception of "new persons,"
and probably does not apply if the tap ends immediately after
perception of a new crime. When the tap continues, however,
agents should quickly obtain an amendment even though several
courts have excused apparent violations of the strict terms of the
statute.
The sealing and notice requirements apply after the wiretap is
removed, and thus operate as conditions subsequent. The courts
have been reluctant to allow violation of these conditions to result
in suppression, and most courts will excuse trivial variations from
the precise requirements of the statute. Nevertheless, a serious
violation, such as failure to seal the tapes or failure to serve notice,
may still cause suppression of all the wiretap evidence.
Wiretapping is a powerful tool of law enforcement, but if
abused it is an equally powerful invasion of innocent citizens'
rights. The officials entrusted with the use of the wiretap must
work with a healthy respect for the rights of the suspect as well as
the rights of third parties who chance to use the telephone. When
the officials err, the courts must be quick to correct the error and
enforce the law; too often judges have deferred to the agents'
blithe reassurances of good faith, and too often they have balked at
applying the statutory remedies. Concluding its discussion of a
minimization case, one court of appeals wrote:
It is clear ...

that a court should not admit evidence derived
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from an electronic surveillance order unless .. it is left with the
conviction that on the whole the agents have shown a high
regard for the right of privacy and have done all they reasonably
313
could to avoid unnecessary intrusion.
Andrew M. Low
313 United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866

(1973).

